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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT
Peter A. Alces•
Luther M Dorr, Jr. ••
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The phases of fraud are manifold" 1 and developing fraud rules
which are both reasonably certain and sufficiently flexible presents a substantial challenge to the drafters of commercial law.
As to relief against frauds, no invariable rules can be established.
Fraud is infinite; and were a Court of Equity once to lay down rules,
how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their relief
against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes,
which the fertility of man's invention would contrive. 2
Lord Hardwicke's conclusion notwithstanding, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has endeavored to
fix rules, some more "invariable" than others, intending to proscribe
truly fraudulent transactions while not unduly impairing the free and
dynamic flow of commerce.
In February of 1985 the American Bar Association (ABA) approved
the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), promulgated in August of 1984 by the NCCUSL. 3 The new Act is the Commissioners' latest attempt to formulate the law governing the rights of defrauded
• Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. A.B. 1977, Lafayette College;
J.D. 1980, University of Illinois.
•• Judicial Clerk, United States Senior District Judge Seybourn Lynne. A.B. 1981, University
of South Alabama; J.D. 1985, University of Alabama. The authors gratefully acknowledge the thorough research and editorial assistance provided by Robert G. Boliek. Jr.• J.D. Candidate, 1986, University of Alabama.
I. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 371, 167 N.E. 501, 503 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J., writing
for the majority).
2. Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaims (June 30, 1759), quoted in 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA§ 186, at
212 n.5 (1846).
3. Morris W. Macey chaired the UFfA drafting committee; Frank R. Kennedy served as
Reporter for the project. Members of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the National
Commercial Finance Association, and the ABA attended Committee meetings. In addition, the
ABA sent delegates from its sections on Corporate, Banking, and Business Law, and on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A
U.L.A. 67-68 (West Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as U.F.T.A.).
The drafters renamed the new Act to emphasize that the UFfA applies to realty as well as
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creditors by regulating transactions which impair the capacity of a
debtor to discharge its obligations and, therefore, operate to the prejudice
of those with claims against the debtor. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),4 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 and, to
some extent, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)6 currently regulate
such transactions.
This article places the UFfA in historical context and compares the
new Act to the prior law, describing the provisions of the new Act in
some detail. Then, the article offers a critical evaluation of the UFTA
and considers applying the new uniform law to problems of significant
current interest to commercial transactors. The article concludes that
the UFTA leaves unanswered problems of increasing concern to the
commercial community and urges reconsideration of certain crucial assumptions of the new uniform Act. An appendix to this article reproduces the full text of the UFfA. For the reader unfamiliar with the
contexts in which fraudulent commercial transfers may arise, this article
provides a hypothetical fact pattern in the margin. 7
personal property transactions, and to involuntary as well as voluntary transfers of a debtor's property. See id. at 68.
The ABA approved the Act at its meeting in Detroit, Michigan, on February 18, 1985. The
NCCUSL formally approved the Act at its meeting in Keystone, Colorado, on July 27-August 3,
1984. See U.F.T.A. The title page of the pamphlet edition of the Act published by the NCCUSL
provides notice of and dates of approval.
4. Both the NCCUSL and the ABA approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in
1918. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, Historical Note, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978), superseded by U.F.T.A. [hereinafter cited as U.F.C.A.]. The Commissioners promulgated the UFTA to
replace this increasingly obsolescent earlier model act. See generally U.F.T.A., Prefatory Note (discussing the UFCA's basic characteristics and the various influences leading to the promulgation of
its successor, the UFTA). See also infra notes 8-78 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
the historical influences on the UFTA.
5. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
6. Article 6 of the UCC provides the law governing bulk transfers. See U.C.C. §§ 6-101 to
-111 ( 1978).
Common law adopting the Statute of Elizabeth also regulates fraudulent conveyances in nonUFCA states; see, e.g., Rice v. Wood, 61 Ark. 442, 33 S.W. 636 (1896); Butler v. Moore, 73 Me. 151
(1882); Reynolds v. Vilas, 8 Wis. 227 (1858). Statutes essentially embodying the Statute of Elizabeth
rule provide similar regulations; see, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 8-9-6 (1984); VERNON's TEX. REv. C1v.
STAT. ANN. art. 3996 (Vernon 1966) (repealed 1967); see TEX. Bus. & CoMM. CODE ANN.§ 24.02
(Vernon 1968)).
7. DebtorCo, a small construction business, borrows money to purchase construction equipment. Sister Corp., a real estate company that has a substantial ownership interest in DebtorCo,
loans the money to DebtorCo and takes a security interest in the equipment.
A year later, DebtorCo experiences financial difficulty. Although the company accountant can
produce a balance sheet that demonstrates solvency, DebtorCo barely pays its bills and has not paid
one large account debt for construction materials in over three months.
Pursuant to an agreement between DebtorCo and Sister Corp., DebtorCo stops making
monthly payments on its loan from Sister Corp. Sister Corp. then declares that DebtorCo is in
default under the terms of the loan agreement, and exercises its right to repossess and sell the collateral to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. Sister Corp. buys the equipment at the foreclosure sale
for approximately 60% of its market value, then leases the equipment back to DebtorCo under a
long-term lease.
One month before DebtorCo is scheduled to distribute regular dividends to shareholders, a
motorist is injured through the recklessness of a DebtorCo truck driver. DebtorCo proceeds with its
scheduled distribution to shareholders. DebtorCo makes the payment according to state corporation
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A.

The Statute of Elizabeth 8
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The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act resulted from the evolution
of the law of conveyances in fraud of creditors. While fraudulent dispositions of property were regulated under Roman law, 9 Anglo-American
rules in this area descend from England's Statute of 13 Elizabeth, enacted in 1571. 10 The original penalty under the Statute was forfeiture of
the fraudulently conveyed property value-half to the government and
half to the injured creditor. 11 The English courts, however, construed the
Statute as providing a private remedy and allowed judgment creditors to
simply ignore a fraudulent transfer and to proceed directly against the
property. 12
The Statute of Elizabeth required that a creditor prove actual, subjective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud to avoid a conveyance. 13 Belaw and does not deplete its assets to the point where its liabilities would exceed assets. The distribution, however, substantially reduces the company's cash assets at a time when the company is preparing to begin work on a major construction project.
With proof of an actual intent by DebtorCo and Sister Corp. to defraud creditors, any creditor
may challenge the default and forfeiture scheme and the resulting foreclosure sale as fraudulent. In
addition, creditors who held claims against DebtorCo at the time of the foreclosure sale and the
shareholder distribution may challenge those transactions under constructive fraud claims. Briefly,
these constructive fraud claims may allege that DebtorCo received inadequate consideration to support the transaction and that DebtorCo (I) was rendered insolvent thereafter; (2) intended to incur
debts beyond its ability to pay; or (3) was left with insufficient assets to carry out its business. Such
claims also may allege that Sister Corp. was an "insider" of DebtorCo, transacted to satisfy an
antecedent debt owed Sister Corp. by DebtorCo, and knew of DebtorCo's financial difficulties.
8. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571).
9. SeeM. Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109 (1931). Roman law elaborately developed thefraus creditorum cause of action. "Fraus" in Latin means "prejudice" or "disadvantage," rather than "misrepresentation," a significant distinction in light of the
Anglo-American law's confusion over actual and constructive fraud. /d. at 110-11 (citing JusrtNIAN's DIGEST).
The development of Roman fraudulent conveyance law was marked by a severe attitude toward
insolvents. The ancient Romans dealt with debtors in the same manner as with thieves. A single
judgment creditor could sell a debtor into slavery or put the debtor to death. If a debtor was so
unfortunate as to have incurred debts with several creditors, then these creditors legally could dismember the debtor's body and divide it among themselves. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 15
(Belknap Press ed. 1963).
10. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 58 (rev. ed. 1940). See
also 27 Eliz., ch. 4 (1585) (supplementing original Statute by protecting purchasers of realty from
fraudulent conveyances).
11. "[P]arties to such feigned, covinous or fraudulent . . . alienation . . . shall incur the penalty and forfeiture of one year's value of [the fraudulently conveyed real property]; . . . and the
whole value of the said goods and chattels; . . . and also as much money as are or shall be contained
in any such covinous and feigned bond; . . . the one moiety where of to be to the Queen's Majesty
.. . and the other moiety to the party or parties grieved." 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § III. Originally promulgated as a criminal sanction, the Statute imposed a penalty of six months. See id. (parties lawfully
convicted "shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year without bail or mainprise").
12. See Mannocke's Case, 3 Dyer 294b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1571) (disregarding penal
provisions of Statute and allowing creditor to recover value of property fraudulently conveyed).
13. The Statute's purpose was as follows:
avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous and fraudulent feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments and executions . . . which . . . are devised and
contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the end purpose and intent, to delay,
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cause subjective intent to defraud was difficult to prove, courts focused
on objective factors to establish the wrongful intent. 14 Decisions under
the Statute soon turned on "circumstances, so frequently attending sales,
conveyances and transfers, intended to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, that they [were] known and denominated badges of fraud." 15 The
court in Twyne's Case 16 cataloged several factors having particular probative force: (1) the debtor made a general transfer of all property; (2)
the debtor retained possession and use of the property; (3) the transfer
was clandestine; (4) the transfer was made "pending the writ"; (5) the
parties created a trust to govern use of the property; or (6) the deed explicitly vouched for its own validity and the parties' honesty and good
faith. 17
American jurisdictions enacted legislation similar to the Statute of
Elizabeth or adopted the Statute as part of the common law} 8 The
American courts similarly adopted the English decisions that expanded
the Statute through the use of objective indicia of fraud; later American
decisions also increased the list of "badges." 19 Although a strict construction of the Statute required proof of fraudulent intent, many courts
permitted creditors to avoid a transfer on the basis of objective factors
alone. 20 The resulting decisions became increasingly difficult to rationalize. Ultimately, some of the objective indicia of fraud rose to the status
of conclusive presumptions21 and once the courts found these objective
criteria, evidence of the parties' intent was neither required nor relevant. 22 For example, when an insolvent debtor transferred property for
hinder or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts,
damages, penalties, forfeitures, heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs.
13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1571).
14. See, e.g., F. WAIT, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' BILLS§ 224 (3d ed.
1897) (discussing the need to rely on objective indicia to prove fraud in most circumstances). See
also Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 432, 434, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1172 (K.B. 1776) ( ..[t]hese statutes
cannot receive too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud").
15. Thames & Co. v. Rembert's Adm'r, 63 Ala. 561, 567 (1879) (emphasis in original) (invalidating conveyance by insolvent debtor to relative, when debtor was pressed by a large suit and
retained possession of some property supposedly conveyed).
16. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) (setting aside preferential conveyance
of debtor's farm and personal property).
17. See id. Later decisions expanded the badges of fraud to include virtually any circumstance
suggesting fraud. See, e.g., M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES 515-28 (K.
Knowlton 2d ed. 1911) (defining and cataloging various minor badges of fraud). The number of
badges may be ..as infinite in number and form as are the resources and versatility of human artifice." Shealy & Finn v. Edwards, 75 Ala. 411, 417 (1883).
18. See M . BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 23-29 (discussing states' adoption or enactment of
Statute); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, §58.
19. See F. WAIT, supra note 14, § 22.
20. See. e.g., Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. 501, 516 (Pa. 1809) ( ..Although the Statute 13
Eliz. . . . is bottomed on the supposition of an immoral intention, yet it has been judged necessary
to determine, that certain circumstances, which, in their nature, tend to deceive and injure creditors,
shall be considered as sufficient evidence of fraud.") and cases cited in D. EPSTEIN, TEACHING
MATERIALS ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 244-46 (1973) and S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 354-55 (2d ed. 1975).
21 . See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 355.
22. See, e.g., Bean-Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v. Standard Spoke Co., 131 F. 215 (6th Cir. 1904)
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inadequate consideration, the courts presumed as a matter of law that
such a conveyance was in fact motivated by an intent to defraud. 23
If the debtor is insolvent when he makes the gift, or the effect of it is
to leave him insolvent, his intent appears as a conclusion of law
drawn from these facts. His intent, in these circumstances, is to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, because of the working principle that one is taken to have contemplated the necessary
consequences of his acts. 24
As use of the badges of fraud increased, fraudulent transfer cases
focused on the prejudicial effect of a particular conveyance on the
debtor's creditors, rather than on the actual intent of the
debtor/transferor and the transferee. 25 In Rolfe v. Clarke, 26 a terminally
ill debtor transferred real property to a friend in exchange for a promise
to care for the debtor and her husband. The trial judge found no intent
to defraud on the part of the debtor or her transferee and refused to avoid
the transfer. The decision was reversed, however, on appeal. The appellate court noted that several of the traditional badges of fraud were present and that the complaining creditor had been adversely affected by the
transfer. 27 The facts "showed an intention of the grantor which was
fraudulent in law, although there was no actual intent to defraud her
(invalidating conveyance by debtor of majority of corporation's assets to another corporation owned
by debtor without inquiry into debtor's intent); Briggs v. Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N.E. 436
(1914) (stating that common law under Statute of Elizabeth creates a presumption of fraud from
conveyance by an insolvent for inadequate consideration).
23. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U.S. 479 (1875) (recognizing Georgia rule whereby objective
factors may raise rebuttable presumption offraud); Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73, 19 S. W. 111 (1892)
(conveyance of real property to debtor's 5-year-old son for no consideration presumed fraudulent as
to creditors); Hanscome-James-Winship v. Ainger, 71 Cal. App. 735, 236 P. 325 (1925) (transfer
from insolvent debtor to wife for love and attention created presumption of fraud); Briscoe v.
Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326 (1846) (invalidating transfer by debtor where consideration amounted to onehalf the value of the property transferred).
24. G. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES§ 270, at 362-63 (1931). Aminority rule went even further, conclusively presuming any gifts given by a debtor to be fraudulent as
a matter of law. See Haston v. Castner, 31 N .J. Eq. 697 (N.J. Ch. 1879) (allowing creditors to
proceed against property conveyed to debtor's son for no consideration); Reade v. Livingston, 3
Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (setting aside antenuptial conveyance of debtor's property in trust
for the benefit of the debtor's wife and children). See also S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 355.
25. See, e.g., Sims v. Gaines, 64 Ala. 392 (1879) (transfer of land later claimed to be only a
mortgage held fraudulent as to existing creditors); Schaible v. Ardner, 98 Mich. 70, 56 N.W. 1105
(1893) (conveyance by debtor to son which left debtor with no assets to satisfy a pending tort claim
presumptively was fraudulent as to creditors); Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62, 64 (1860) (setting
aside conveyance when debtor was "in greatly embarrassed circumstances" with respect to creditors).
The question of fraudulent intent "is now generally considered to tum upon the consideration
whether the debtor was at the time in a situation to make the [conveyance) injustice to his creditors.
i.e., without delaying them in the enforcement of their rights." M. BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 78.
See also F. WAIT, supra note 14, § 9, at 19 ("Whenever the effect of a particular transaction is to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the law infers or supplies the intent, though there may be no
direct evidence of a corrupt or dishonorable motive, but, on the contrary, an actual honest, but
mistaken motive existed.").
26. 224 Mass. 407, 113 N.E. 182 (1916).
27. See id. at 411, 113 N.E. at 183 (noting the close relationship between debtor and transferee,
intangible nature of consideration, and hardship caused to creditors).
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creditors."28 The ultimate test, then, became whether there had been an
"unjust diminution of the estate of the debtor that otherwise would be
available to the creditor." 29
Such judicial analyses undermined the operation of the Statute of
Elizabeth. 30 Expansive constructions of the Statute created specious decisions and substantial confusion. 31 In addition, the procedural requirements for challenging a conveyance varied considerably among the
jurisdictions. 32 Fundamental differences among the states as to the timing, scope, and effect of a judgment or lien against a debtor exacerbated
the confusion. 33 Those issues, in turn, brought into question the proper
length and starting point for applicable limitation periods. 34 Thus, the
need for curative uniform legislation was manifest.

B.

The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 35

The drafters of the UFCA attempted to respond to the ambiguities
in fraudulent conveyance law by providing uniformity and predictabil28. ld. at 411, 113 N.E. at 183-84.
29. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 195, at 348. Decisions turned on "whether as a result of the
debtor's operations on the title to his property, the creditor loses by reason of finding less to seize and
apply to his claim." Jd.
30. M. BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 515-27. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 243-44.
31. See,e.g., F. WAIT, supra note 14, at 440-41 (criticizing courts' tendencies to injure honest
debtors and purchasers, caused by poorly defined rules regarding the weight properly accorded to
different badges of fraud).
32. The Statute of Elizabeth's provisions led to a general requirement of a judgment and an
unsatisfied return as a condition precedent to a fraudulent conveyance action. See, e.g., Bond v.
Warren County State Bank, 201 Iowa 1175, 207 N.W. 233 (1926); Jackson v. Holbrook, 36 Minn.
494, 32 N.W. 852 (1887); Hart v. A.L. Clarke & Co., 194 N.Y. 403, 87 N.E. 808 (1909). Because the
possibilities of precluding a jury trial on the creditor's underlying claim and of tying up the property
of an alleged debtor existed, courts were reluctant to allow simultaneous actions in equity and at law.
See, e.g., Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451, 459 (1893); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109 (1891); Adler
Goldman Comm'n Co. v. Williams, 211 F. 530, 533 (W.O. Ark. 1914). As debtor-creditor law
became more sympathetic to the interests of creditors, courts developed various exceptions to the
judgment requirement and allowed a creditor to proceed directly against a conveyance without first
obtaining judgment against the debtor. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487, 77 P.
1043 (1904) Gudgment would be impossible or useless); Crary v. Kurtz, 132 Iowa 105, 105 N.W. 590
(1906) (debtor had died); American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929) (delay in
obtaining judgment would unduly prejudice creditors' rights). Some jurisdictions adopted substantive rules allowing a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance before obtaining a legal remedy.
See, e.g., ALA. CoDE§ 6-6-182 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 11-5-75 (1972); W.VA. CODE§ 40-1-14
(1982). See also Note, Creditors' Rights-Attempt to Reach Debtors' Equitable Assets-Requirement
of Prior Judgment and Execution at Law, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1141 (1934).
33. For example, some jurisdictions held that a judgment lien could attach to fraudulently
conveyed realty. See, e.g., McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 2d 468, 60 P.2d 1026 (1936); Jackson v. Holbrook,
36 Minn. 494, 32 N.W. 852 (1887); Hillyer v. LeRoy, 179 N.Y. 369, 72 N.E. 237 (1904). Other
states did not allow a judgment lien creditor to attach fraudulently conveyed realty. See, e.g., Union
Nat'l Bank v. Lane, 177 Ill. 171, 52 N.E. 361 (1898); Joyce v. Perry, Ill Iowa 567, 82 N.W. 941
(1900); Preston-Parton Milling Co. v. Dexter Horton & Co., 22 Wash. 236, 60 P. 412 (1900). See 1
G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 121.
34. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 357 (limitations period could run from date of sale,
judgment, execution of writ, or return on execution).
35. See supra note 4.
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ity. 36 They focused on the uncertainties attending increasingly sophisticated, and often interstate, commercial transactions. 37 Specifically, the
drafters responded to the three primary areas under the existing legislation and common law that confused courts and commentators: courts
unevenly applied the insolvency concept; 38 courts inconsistently specified
the proper parties and procedural steps necessary to challenge a conveyance; and courts extended fraudulent conveyance law to transfers carried
out without actual fraudulent intent. 39
Professor William Draper Lewis drafted the UFCA, 40 at the request
of the NCCUSL's Committee on Commercial Law.41 Drafts were
presented to the Conference for criticism and revision before the finished
product was approved in 1918.42 The ABA approved the Act in 1919. 43
The legal community generally received the UFCA well. 44 Commentators praised the Act and recommended its adoption to the states. 45
Within six years of its promulgation, fourteen jurisdictions had enacted
the UFCA. 46 The Bankruptcy Code also incorporated the Act as a supplementary remedy for bankruptcy trustees seeking to recover the
debtor's fraudulently transferred property. 47 To date, however, only
twenty-six jurisdictions have adopted the Act. 48 Only four states have
36. See generally U.F.C.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Notes (1918) ("There are few legal subjects where there is a greater lack of exact definition and clear understanding of boundaries.").
37. See U.F.C.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Comments (1918).
38. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
39. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note. See also McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REv. 404-05 (1933) (assessing value of UFCA fourteen years after
enactment).
40. William Draper Lewis was a Professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law at
the time the UFCA was drafted. Samuel Williston was a member of the committee that requested
Lewis's assistance. One commentator asserts that Williston principally drafted the UFCA. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 247.
41. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 254 (1916).
42. See Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, 5 A.B.A. J. 481 (1919).
·
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. l, 12 (1938) (UFCA offers "clarity and breadth of view" to state
law); Current Legislation, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 339 (1920) (UFCA "should commend itself to
the legislatures of the States which have yet to consider it"); Rose & Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud
of Creditors. Ohio Law and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 571, 611 (1948) (citing "important
improvements" offered by the Act); Comment, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances in North Carolina: An Analysis and Comparison with the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 50 N.C.L. REV.
873, 901-02 (1972) (UFCA would offer clear, simple provisions as replacement for confusing state
statutes); Note, Remedies of a Creditor for Setting Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance with Recommendations for Changes, 6 S.C.L.Q. 80, 85 (1953) (UFCA is "highly desirable" because it provides "a
positive course" which the creditor may follow).
45. See sources cited id.
46. See U.F.C.A. Historical Note Oisting UFCA jurisdictions). The early UFCA jurisdictions
"included the commercially most important states of the Union." Radin, supra note 44, at 12.
47. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~~ 548.01 -.11 (L. King 15th ed. 1985) (comparing bankruptcy provisions to UFCA).
48. See U.F.C.A. (Supp. 1985). The following states have adopted the Act: Arizona (1919),
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-1001 to -1013 (1967 and West 1984 Supp.); California (1939), CAL.
CJV. CODE§§ 3439 to 3439.12 (West 1970); Delaware {1919), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301 to
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enacted the UFCA since 1960,49 and only one state has adopted the Act
in the past fifteen years. 50
At the time of its promulgation the UFCA offered a new conceptual
approach and terminology. 51 Although it has provided a restatement of
the Statute of Elizabeth's actual fraudulent intent rule, 52 the Act has focused primarily on the forms of constructive fraud that the parties could
prove with objective indicia. 53 Transactions unsupported by adequate
consideration54 and certain partnership transactions55 are fraudulent
1312 (1975); Idaho (1969), IDAHO CODE§§ 55-910 to -922 (1979); Maryland (1920), MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -214 (1983 and 1984 Supp.); Massachusetts (1924), MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 109A, §§ 1 to 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); Michigan (1919), MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§§ 566.11 to .23 (West 1967); Minnesota (1921), MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 513.20 to .32 (West
1947}; Montana (1945), MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-301 to -325 (1983); Nebraska (1980), NEB.
REv. STAT.§§ 36-601 to -613 (1984); Nevada (1931), NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 112.010 to .130 (1984);
New Hampshire (1919}, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 545:1 to :12 (1974); New Jersey (1919}, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 25:2-7 to -19 (West 1940 and 1985 Supp.); New Mexico (1959), N .M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56-10.1 to -13 (1978); New York (1925), N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§§ 270.81 (McKinney 1945
and 1984 Supp.); North Dakota (1943), N.D. CENT. CoDE§§ 13-02-01 to -11 (1981); Ohio (1961),
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1336.01 to .12 (Page 1979); Oklahoma (1965), OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 101-11 (West Supp. 1984); Pennsylvania (1921), 39 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 351-63
(Purdon 1954); South Dakota (1919), S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 54-8-5 to -19 (1980); Tennessee (1919), TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 66-3-301 to -314 (1982); Utah (1925}, UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 25-11 to -16 (1984); Virgin Islands (1957), V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§ 201-12 (1976); Washington (1945),
WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 19.40.010 to .130 (1978); Wisconsin (1919), WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 242.Ql to .13 (West 1957); Wyoming (1929), WYO. STAT. §§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1977).
49. Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma are the four states. See id.
50. See supra note 48.
51. Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REv. 495,497 (1983) (UFCA
otTers new terminology and approach to familiar judicial rules). The Act did not attempt to "so
much change the law as clearly define what heretofore (had] been indefinite." U.F.C.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Notes.
52. "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished
from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." U.F.C.A. § 7.
53. See McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 407; Radin, supra note 44, at 7-8; Cu"ent Legislation,
supra note 44, at 339.
54. § 4: Conveyances by Insolvent. Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without
regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration.
§ 5: Conveyances by Persons in Business. Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent.
§ 6: Conveyances by a Person About to Incur Debts. Every conveyance made and every
obligation incurred without fair consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as
they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6.
55. Conveyance of Partnership Property. Every conveyance of partnership property and
every partnership obligation incurred when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred,
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership debts, or
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership as distinguished
from consideration to the individual partners.
/d.§ 8.
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under the UFCA irrespective of the parties' actual intentions. The drafters retained the complete protection which the Statute of Elizabeth gave
to good faith purchasers for value56 and defined certain crucial concepts
and key terms such as "insolvency," 57 "fair consideration," 58 "debt," 59
and "creditor." 60
In practice, however, the UFCA has not always achieved the drafters' goal to "clearly define what heretofore has been indefinite." 61 Many
courts in UFCA states still struggle to properly apply the badges of
fraud. 62 Courts continue to resolve claims based on actual fraudulent intent by using the traditional badges rather than proof of subjective intent. 63 Indeed, some UFCA decisions draw no significant distinction
between actual and constructive fraud. 64 Courts often resolve creditors'
56. See id. § 9 (giving defrauded creditors a right of recovery against any party "except a
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase").
57. Insolvency.
(I) A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the
amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become
absolute and matured.
(2) In determining whether a partnership is insolvent there shall be added to the partnership property the present fair salable value of the separate assets of each general partner in
excess of the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his separate creditors, and also
the amount of any unpaid subscription to the partnership of each limited partner, provided the
present fair salable value of the assets of such limited partner is probably sufficient to pay his
debts, including such unpaid subscription.
/d.§ 2.
58. Fair Consideration. Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,.
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in
good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance
or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property, or obligation obtained.
/d. § 3.
59. " 'Debt' includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." /d. § 1.
60. " 'Creditor' is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or
unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." /d.
61. /d., Commissioners' Prefatory Note. See also McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 452 (concluding that states' use of the UFCA was inadequate, with frequent failure to apply the Act in the
appellate courts).
62. Commentaries that encouraged the use of badges of fraud, excluded by the UFCA in intentional fraud cases, even after adoption of the UFCA illustrated the confusion over the proper role of
these badges. See, e.g., Note, Creditors' Rights-Remedies Available to Tort Creditor Without Judgment in Michigan and Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 48 MICH. L. REV. 711, 71213 (1950); Note, Fraudulent Conveyances-Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act-Presumptions of
Intent-Limitations ofActions-Necessity for Prior Judgment-Rights of Insurance Beneficiaries, 23
MINN. L. REV. 616, 618-20 (1938). The decisions of courts applying the UFCA also demonstrate a
reluctance to forego using objective indicia to prove fraudulent subjective intent by preserving the
badges of fraud. See Bentley v. Caille, 289 Mich. 74, 286 N .W. 163 (1939); Thompson v. Schiek, 171
Minn. 284, 213 N.W. 911 (1927); Conway v. Raphe), 101 N.J. Eq. 495, 138 A. 691 (1927), a.lf'd, 102
N.J. Eq. 531, 141 A. 804 (1928).
63. See Westminster Savings Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 39 A.2d 862 (1944); Paxton v.
Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932); In re Reed's Estate, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977).
64. See. e.g., In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 23 Banke. 823 (Banke. N.D. Ohio 1982)
(presuming actual fraudulent intent from debtor's insolvency); Bryan v. Wilson, 171 Md. 421, 189
A. 220 (1937) (inferring intentional fraud from glaring disparity between value of debtor's property
and consideration received); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585
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claims alleging alternative types of fraud with a summary conclusion that
the evidence demonstrates the fraud alleged. 65 When conveyances are set
aside the decisions often do not indicate clearly whether the conveyance
was actually or constructively fraudulent. 66 Because only present creditors may challenge constructively fraudulent transfers by an insolvent
debtor, this distinction is significant.67
Despite the efforts of the drafters, considerable uncertainty also has
persisted concerning who is a creditor, the party with standing to challenge a conveyance, and what procedural steps must be taken before
bringing a claim under the UFCA. 68 Because it abolishes the judgment
requirement and tends to blur the line between actions in equity and actions at law, the UFCA also has raised state constitutional issues in New
Jersey. 69
Recently counsel for unsecured creditors have convinced courts to
construe the UFCA as providing a basis for objection when a secured
party forecloses on a debtor's encumbered property and then sells the
property at the foreclosure sale for less than the market value. The leading case is Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 70 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a foreclosure sale as a fraudulent conveyance because the property was sold for
only 57.7% of its market value. 71 Later cases have described the "Dur(1971) (distinguishing intentional and constructive fraud as requiring different levels of proof, rather
than as distinct theories of recovery).
65. See, e.g., Virta v. Mackey, 343 Mass. 286, 178 N.E.2d 571 (1961) (stating only that evidence supported finding of intentional fraud without discussing constructive fraud); Hartnett v.
Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (1932) (court did not differentiate between gift given by
insolvent and transfer made with intent to incur debts beyond ability to pay).
66. Tomason v. Wagner, 228 Minn. 124, 36 N.W.2d 587 (1949) (finding actual fraudulent
intent in conveyance for insufficient consideration); Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1977) ·
(stating that evidence supported finding of actual or constructive fraud without distinguishing between the two types of fraud).
67. Only a creditor whose claim existed before the suspect transaction may challenge transfers
by an insolvent debtor for inadequate consideration under the UFCA. See U.F.C.A. § 4. The Act
allows all creditors, regardless of when their claims arose, to challenge all other types of fraud. See
id. §§ 5-7.
68. A 1920 review of the UFCA described its apparent abolition of the judgment requirement
as a "revolutionary" development that would "require some hard straining" to avoid "turbulent
possibilities." Current Legislation, supra note 44, at 341. Some states that previously had required a
final judgment or lien as a prerequisite to creditor status continued to do so despite the UFCA's
liberal definition of a creditor. See, e.g., Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 A. 644
(1928) (court will set aside conveyance only when creditor proves through judgment and unissued
execution that there is no adequate remedy at law); Comstock v. Horton, 235 Mich. 282, 209 N.W.
179 (1926) (requiring judgment to fix amount of debt before allowing creditor's bill).
69. See Gross v. Pennsylvania Mortgage & Loan Co., 104 N.J. Eq. 439, 146 A. 328 (1929)
(UFCA held unconstitutional because it allowed equity court to determine damages on contract
claim); Note, Rights of Creditors Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 35 DICK. L. REv.
171, 173-74 (1930) (discussing New Jersey courts' treatment of UFCA "creditor" definition).
70. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). The Durrett decision construed section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 67(d)(2), however, is virtually identical to and is derived from section 4 of the
UFCA.
71. 621 F .2d at 203. For a thorough consideration of the Durrett rule, compare Alden, Gross
& Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1605 (1983) (defending Durrett as protective of creditors' interests) with
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rett rule" as providing that unsecured creditors may avoid a foreclosure
sale for less than seventy percent of the property value as a fraudulent
transfer of the debtor's property. 72 But the Ninth Circuit, in In re Madrid, 73 has refused to follow the Durrett rule. The Madrid court presumed that the price obtained in a regularly conducted, noncollusive
foreclosure sale is adequate. 74 These conflicting interpretations of the
UFCA have sparked debate regarding the balance between the interests
of unsecured creditors and the need for certainty in secured credit
transactions. 75
Finally, several questions have restricted the usefulness of the
UFCA. For example, the effect of the Act on prior statutory and case
law is unclear. 76 Similarly debatable is the proper interpretation of "fair
consideration" and "good faith." 77 Also, developments in other areas of
debtor-creditor law have confused courts applying UFCA provisions:
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 have created conflicts between the federal law and the UFCA, as
have changes in the UCC concerning perfection of secured transactions.
The committee which is revising the Model Corporation Act (MCA) recently has requested a review of the UFCA to determine whether that
Act is consistent with the MCA's treatment of dividend distributions. 78
The UFfA represents the NCCUSL's response to these issues.
Ill.

THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

The new uniform Act follows substantially the structure and organization of the UFCA. This article treats the provisions of the two acts in
three sections for purposes of exposition and comparison. First, this article considers the provisions that describe the forms of fraudulent transZinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of
Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAw. 977 (1984) (criticizing Durrett as disruptive to real estate financing).
72. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 71, at 978-79. See In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984) (concluding that Durrett language creates 70% rule). But see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv.
Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (concluding that Durrett only
created 57.7% rule).
73. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984). In order to affirm the decision of the bankruptcy appellate panel, the
court of appeals held that the foreclosure sale was not a "transfer" for purposes of section 548, and
that the transfer occurred at the time the trust deed was perfected, thus precluding the creditor's
challenge as beyond the limitations period. 725 F .2d at 1199.
74. 21 Bankr. at 426-27. See also In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc., 23 Bankr. 36
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (the circumstances of a foreclosure sale ensure that the price obtained is an
accurate indicator of the value of the debtor's property).
75. See supra note 71.
76. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 62 (UFCA leaves many rules and ideas untouched; practitioner must take note of local diversities and judicial rules).
77. See Comment, supra note 51, at 495 (discussing conflicting constructions of UFCA's good
faith requirement); Comment, Fraudulent Conveyances--Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act-Fair
Consideration, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 341 (comparing divergent interpretations of Act's fair consideration definition).
78. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note.
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fers. The article then reviews the remedies provided to defrauded
creditors by the UFTA and UFCA. Finally, the article considers the
rights and liabilities of fraudulent transferees under both acts.

1.

A. Transactions in Fraud of Creditors
Intent to Hinder, Delay, or Defraud

The new Act continues the UFCA rule proscribing transactions executed with an actual, subjective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.79 The UFTA, however, acknowledges the usefulness of objective
criteria by listing a number of appropriate factors that courts may consider in assessing the debtor's and its transferee's subjective intent. 80 The
factors correspond closely to the common law badges of fraud which
courts applied under the UFCA to create a presumption of fraudulent
intent. 81 In the UFfA these factors are mere relevant evidence, however, and not presumptions. 82 The UFTA comments encourage courts to
consider any circumstantial evidence that negates the existence of
fraud. 83
The new Act maintains the UFCA distinction between creditors
whose claims have matured at the time a suspect transaction occurs
(present creditors) and those whose claims arise after the transaction but
before the fraudulent transfer action begins (future creditors).84 Both
present and future creditors may challenge transfers intended to hinder,
delay, or defraud.85 The new Act follows the Statute of Elizabeth and
UFCA rationale that actual, fraudulent intent represents a higher degree
of culpability and justifies a larger class of potential plaintiffs. 86
2. Sufficiency of Consideration Received by Debtor
Both the UFTA and UFCA deem certain transactions fraudulent
solely because objective factors indicate that the rights of unsecured cred79. See id. § 4(a)(l). UFCA section 7 provides: "Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."
U.F.C.A. § 7.
80. See U.F.T.A. § 4(b).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 13-29.
82. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 5.
83. See id. at comment 6.
84. The major organizational change of the UFfA reflects this distinction: the types of fraud
actionable under the Act are divided into those challengeable by present and future creditors and
those that present creditors may attack alone. Compare U.F.C.A. §§ 4-8 (providing individually
which particular creditors may challenge the various types of fraudulent transactions) with U.F.T.A.
§§ 4, 5.
85. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l).
86. Compare id. with 13 Eliz., ch., 5 § II and U.F.C.A. § 7.
Stronger evidence of fraud is required in a case brought by a subsequent creditor because ordinarily a person is free to dispose of his property as he sees fit if he is not indebted at the time.
Therefore a subsequent creditor must prove actual fraud in the conveyance rather than mere
constructive fraud which is usually held to be sufficient in the case of an existing creditor.
Coleman v. Alderman, 357 Mo. 758, 760, 210 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1948).
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itors have been prejudiced. The acts consider these constructively fraudulent transfers sufficiently harmful to unsecured creditors to justify
avoidance of a transaction, regardless of the actual intent of the debtor
and its transferee. A creditor challenging a transaction as constructively
fraudulent must show that the transfer was made or the obligation incurred for insufficient consideration. 87 The UFCA's "fair consideration"
definition has involved a two-part test that appraises the value received
by the debtor as well as the good faith of the transferee. 88 In early
UFCA cases, courts looked almost entirely to the value given to the
debtor and rarely considered the intentions of the parties. 89 More recently, courts deciding cases under the Act have focused on the transferee's good faith and ignored the sufficiency of the consideration
received. 90 As a result, courts have avoided preferential transfers which
normally are avoidable only in a bankruptcy proceeding.91
The UFTA drafters have removed the issue of the transferee's good
faith froll). the constructive fraud calculus, focusing instead on the
debtor's receipt of reasonably equivalent value.92 Transferees may prove
their good faith as a defense to the avoidance action. 93 The new Act fails
to define reasonably equivalent value, but instead adopts the Bankruptcy
Code's general approach to the concept. 94 Decisions construing the
bankruptcy definition of value do not offer certainty or predictability,
however, as courts have concluded that the fact finder must have considerable discretion. 95 The case law does not establish a fixed percentage or
87. Compare U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6 (requiring proof of less than "fair consideration") with U.F.T.A.
§§ 4(a)(2), 5 (requiring proof of less than "reasonably equivalent value").
88. See U.F.C.A. § 3. "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a) When in
exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied .. . ." ld.
89. Comment, supra note 51, at 499-502. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
13 Ariz. App. 431,436,477 P.2d 550, 555 (1970) (requiring only a "reasonable and fair proportion"
of value); Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 172, 209 N.W. 883, 885 (1926) (requiring only a "fair
and adequate" value); Osawa v. Onishi, 33 Wash. 2d 546, 558, 206 P.2d 498, 504 (1949) (considering
only whether conveyance rendered debtor "execution proor').
90. See. e.g., Spear v. Spear, 101 Misc. 2d 341, 421 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (invalidating
bona fide confession of judgment to debtor's girlfriend, when she apparently knew that transaction
would hinder other creditors); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585
(1971) (invalidating mortgage to secure a genuine debt to debtor's attorney, when attorney knew
debtor was near financial collapse).
91. Comment, supra note 51, at 502-03. Certain preferential transfers may be invalid under
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547
(West Supp. 1985); Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, Elmer & Nichols, 237 F. 763, 767 (8th Cir.
1916) (debtor has right to pay one creditor in preference to others until commencement of bankruptcy proceedings); Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (E.D. Ill. 1940), affd,
123 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1941) (preference is not an evil act in itself, but one prohibited by Bankruptcy
Act); Abeken v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 170, 172 (E.D. Mo. 1939) ("Aside from the Bankruptcy
Act, a creditor may be preferred by a debtor.").
92. See U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2) & 5(a).
93. See id. § 8(a).
94. The UFTA provides a general, nonexclusive definition of ''value," adopted from 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(d)(2)(A) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). U.F.T.A. § 3
comment 2.
95. 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, 11 548.09, at 548-100 ("courts have not been too exacting in
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safe harbor but indicates that courts will consider the circumstances attending the particular transaction, the type of value exchanged, and the
equitable posture of the parties to the transfer. 96
The prior uniform law has distinguished between transactions in
which the debtor transfers outright ownership, a sale, and those transactions that create a security interest in the debtor's property.97 In a sales
transaction the UFCA has required that the debtor receive a "fair
equivalent."98 In secured transactions, however, the old Act focused on
the difference between the value of the debtor's encumbered property and
the amount received by the debtor. 99 When the amount of the loan to the
debtor was "not disproportionately small," a court would enforce the
obligation incurred. 100 Despite this more relaxed standard, courts often
have invalidated secured transactions under the UFCA. 101 The comments to the new Act recognize that those decisions have ignored the fact
that a lender's interest in secured property may not exceed the amount of
the debt, leaving the remainder of the debtor's property, the equity, available to unsecured creditors. 102 The UFfA does not continue the double
standard, but recognizes that the amount of the secured debt is the measure of the debtor's obligation. 103 Although the delay caused when a
secured creditor satisfies a claim against a debtor's property may prejudice unsecured creditors, the UFrA follows Article 9 of the UCC 104 and
subordinates the interests of unsecured creditors to those of secured creditors in this situation. The new Act, however, leaves open the possibility
applying the criterion"). See Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (allowing consideration of debtor's need for challenged loan and ability to obtain loan elsewhere as well as value of
securities transferred in exchange for loan); accord, Roth v. Fabrikant Bros., 175 F .2d 665 (2d Cir.
1949); Security Discount Co. v. Wesner (In re Peoria Braumeister Co.), 138 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1943); Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Schenecker, 289 Pa. 277, 137 A. 272 (1927).
96. 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, ~ 548.09.
97. Compare U.F.C.A. § 3(a): "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a)
When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith,
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied . . ." with § 3(b): "When such property, or
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not
disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained."
98. See id. § 3(a). See also Willoughby v. King, 21 Ariz. App. 589, 522 P.2d 54 (1974) (examining financial factors for fair equivalence); Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah 577,
70 P.2d 738 (1952) (defining fair equivalence not as a fixed, precise measure but in light of value of
property at time of conveyance); Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor Truck Co., 202 Wis.
266, 232 N.W. 536 (1930) (explaining that fair equivalence may constitute cash or a hardship or
obligation undertaken by the debtor's purchaser).
99. See U.F.C.A. § 3(b).
100. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 471 P.2d 550
( 1970) (finding difference between $11,000 antecedent debt and mortgaged property worth $25,000
was disproportionately small); Trust Co. of Orange v. Garfinkel, 107 N.J. Eq. 20, 151 A. 858 (1930)
(deciding debt of $15,000 was fair consideration for stock worth little more, if anything); Wirtz v.
Jensen (In re Rasmussen's Estate), 238 Wis. 334, 298 N.W. 172 (1941) (voiding security transaction
as Jacking fair consideration when property mortgaged was worth several times the amount of antecedent debt).
10I. See supra note l 00.
102. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 3.
103. See id. § 3 comment 3, § 4 comment 3.
104. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978).
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that the size of the difference between the amount of the debt and the
value of the collateral may indicate an intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud. 105
Courts construing the UFCA have concluded that an executory
promise is not within the Act's definition of fair consideration. 106 Courts
have rejected some promises to discharge the debtor's obligations or to
support the debtor for life as inadequate value. 107 Other UFCA decisions, however, have reached the opposite result. 108 The new Act strikes
a balance: executory promises made in the ordinary course of business
may serve as consideration sufficient to allow a transfer. 109 Therefore, a
professional builder's promise to make repairs, a farmer's promise to
continue working on a parent's farm for the remainder of the parent's
life, or an assumption of debts may support transfers of the debtor's
property under the new Act. The UFTA's expressed policy is to assess
value from the viewpoint of the particular debtor's unsecured creditors
and to focus upon the overall diminution of the debtor's estate. 110
The drafters of the UFTA respond to the Durrett issue--whether a
court may invalidate a foreclosure sale of secured collateral because the
sale realized an inadequate price 111-in the definition of value. The new
Act conclusively presumes that the value received is sufficient when the
parties transfer property "pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of power of sale." 112 The basis for this
provision is the rationale that a foreclosure sale provides the most accurate means to establish the collateral's fair value. 113 Neither the new Act
nor the comments elaborate on what constitutes a regularly conducted,
noncollusive sale. 114
105. See U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2.
106. See, e.g., Hulsether v. Sanders, 54 S.D. 412, 223 N .W. 335 (1929) (promise to discharge
mortgage and support debtor held insufficient); Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 293 N.W. 173
(1940) (interpreting section to exclude any executory promise not embodied in a negotiable instrument already negotiated to a holder in due course). See also McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 414-15
(concluding that executory promise is not fair consideration under unequivocal language of UFCA
§ 3). The Bankruptcy Code takes the more restrictive view that a promise of future support does not
constitute value. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1985).
107. See, e.g., Sandler v. Parliapiano, 236 A.D. 70, 258 N .Y.S. 88 (1932) (promise of future
support held insufficient); Cooper v. Cooper, 22 Tenn. App. 473, 124 S.W.2d 264 (1938) (promise to
pay criminal judgment, support for life, and pay for funeral expenses held insufficient).
108. See, e.g., Freitag v. Strand of Atlantic City, Inc., 205 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding that
executory promise may be "property" and "fair consideration"); Hollander v. Gautier, 114 N.J. Eq.
485, 168 A. 860 (1933) (deciding enforceable promise may constitute fair consideration under
UFCA). See also Note, Rights of Creditors in Property Conveyed in Consideration ofFuture Support,
45 IOWA L. REv. 546, 550-62 (1960).
109. See U.F.T.A. § 3(a).
110. See id. § 3 comment 2.
111. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
112. U.F.T.A. § 3(b).
113. /d. § 3 comment 5 (citing 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
1227 (1965)).
114. Nor does In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 125
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Once a creditor establishes that the consideration received by the
debtor was inadequate, the creditor must prove additional factors to invalidate a transaction as constructively fraudulent. The three forms of
constructive fraud which the UFfA incorporates from the prior uniform
law emphasize verifiable indicia of the debtor's fiscal welfare.
a.

Transfers Made By An Insolvent Debtor

Under the UFTA present creditors may avoid transfers when the
_debtor/transferor has received inadequate consideration from the transferee and the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or has been
rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer. 115 The bona fides of the
debtor and transferee are not pertinent. 116 This rule was a major innovation117 of the UFCA and continues in the new Act with an expanded
definition of insolvency 118 to help creditors prove and courts determine
when a debtor is insolvent.l 19 The UFTA provides a simplified version
of the UFCA's "balance sheet" test for insolvency: the new Act compares the value of the debtor's liabilities to the value of the debtor's assets.l20 The definition of assets 121 is expansive and includes unliquidated
and contingent claims which are beyond the reach of creditors. 122
The UFTA also adopts the "equitable" test of insolvency: a debtor
is insolvent when the debtor generally is not paying its debts as they
mature. 123 The presumption of insolvency under this test is rebuttable;
the burden of proving the debtor's solvency shifts to the debtor or transferee.124 This equitable test for insolvency contemplates an inquiry into
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984), the case whose rationale is adopted in
section 3(b), define these terms. See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
115. See U .F.T.A. § 5(a).
116. See id. § 2; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Hoffines, 429 Pa. 109, 239 A.2d 458 (1968) (question of actual intent drops out of case) (construing UFCA § 4 which is identical to UFTA § 5(a)).
117. See Radin, supra note 44, at 8 (major aspect of UFCA eliminates any notion of estoppel or
reliance in declaring prejudicial transactions fraudulent as to creditors); U.F.C.A. Prefatory Note
(Act was drafted to remove all possibilities of legal presumptions of intent).
118. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a). In comparison, the UFCA provides that "[a] person is insolvent
when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay
his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured." U.F .C.A. § 2(1).
119. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a). The UFTA adopts a similar definition from the Bankruptcy Code to
determine when a partnership is insolvent. See id. § 2(c) (adapted from 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(8)
(1982)).
120. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a).
121. The UFTA defines assets simply as "property of a debtor," subject to exemptions or encumbrances by a valid lien. U.F.T.A. § 1(2).
122. See id. § 1 comment 2. The UFTA definition does not require that an asset be available to
discharge the debtor's debts. Accordingly, although creditors may not levy execution on and sell an
unliquidated tort claim, courts may include the claim as an asset of the debtor for purposes of
determining whether the debtor is solvent. /d. (citing Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v.
Goldman, 578 F.2d 904, 907-09 (2d Cir. 1978)).
123. See U.F.T.A. § 2(b). The UFTA adopts the equitable test from the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 303(h)(l) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h){l) (West Supp. 1985), and the Uniform
Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 1-201{23) (1978).
124. The party seeking to uphold the transfer must prove that it is more probable than not that
the debtor was solvent. U.F.T.A. § 2 comment 2.
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the circumstances of each particular debtor, considering such factors as
the number of accounts payable, the percentage unpaid, the age of the
accounts, and any good faith disputes or other circumstances which
might account for nonpayment. 125
b.

Unreasonably Small Assets

The UFT A allows both present and future creditors to avoid a
transfer made by a business debtor for inadequate consideration when
the transfer left the debtor with "unreasonably small assets." 126 The parallel UFCA provision refers to "unreasonably small capita/." 127 The
UFTA drafting committee explains that the connotation of "capital" in
corporation law has created uncertainty over which assets of the debtor
courts should consider. 128 In addition, the basis of a capital or stock
valuation is uncertain, as the term may anticipate par value, market
value, or the consideration received for stock issued. 129 The drafters of
the UFIA intend to focus attention on commercial realities. Therefore,
the total market value of the debtor's assets is measured "in light of the
needs of the business or transaction in which the debtor was engaged or
about to engage." 130
c. Debtor's Accumulation of Debts Beyond Its Ability to Pay
The UFTA retains the UFCA rule 131 permitting present and future
creditors to avoid transfers for inadequate consideration when the debtor
intends through the transfer to incur debts beyond its ability to pay} 32
In states which have adopted the UFCA, creditors generally have asserted claims that the debtor entered into a transaction with the intent to
incur debts beyond its ability to pay along with allegations of intentional
fraud. 133 Because the cases have broadly construed the intentional fraud
rule 134-intent to hinder, delay, or defraud-the intent to incur debts
125. /d.
126. See id. § 4(a)(2)(i).
127. Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it is engaged
or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in his hands
after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to
other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction
without regard to his actual intent.
U.F.C.A. § 5 (emphasis added).
128. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 4.
129. See id.
130. /d.
131. "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration when
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or believes that he will
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors." U.F.C.A. § 6.
132. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii).
133. See, e.g. , Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 A. 644 (1928) (holding that
both § 6 and the intentional fraud section of UFCA (§ 7) require proof of an intention to defraud
creditors); Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (1933) (invalidating transfer upon
proof that debtor intended to accumulate debts and to defraud creditors).
134. See. e.g., Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (intentional fraud held to extend
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prov1s1on complements rather than expands the theories available to
creditors asserting a fraudulent conveyance claim. The UFTA formulation, however, may make a difference because it proscribes transfers for
inadequate consideration when the debtor has reason to believe that the
debtor will incur debts beyond its ability to pay. 135 Reference to a reasonableness standard as well as actual intent may expose more suspect
transactions.
3.

Preferential Transfers

The UFTA invalidates preferential transfers to an insider to satisfy
an antecedent debt when the debtor was insolvent and the insider had
reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 136 This innovation is
available only to present creditors. 137 Adopted from the Bankruptcy
Code, 138 the insider definition is nonexclusive and includes virtually anyone in a position to control the debtor. 139
Once creditors whose claims arose before the suspect transaction establish that the transferee was an insider, these creditors may challenge
the transfer whether or not satisfaction of the antecedent debt represents
less than reasonably equivalent value for the debtor's property. 140 The
UFTA provision expressly is inapplicable when the debtor receives new
value from the insider. 141 If an insider lends money to a debtor in exchange for the satisfaction of an antecedent debt, but also takes security
for that loan, then the insider has given no new value to insulate the
transaction from the insider preference rule. 142 Insiders may assert defensively, however, that the transfer occurred in the ordinary course of
business between the insider and debtor, or that at least a portion of the
consideration paid to the debtor is new value given in a good faith attempt to rehabilitate the debtor. 143
B.

Rights of Defrauded Creditors

Defrauded creditors may pursue one or more of several options
under the UFTA, depending upon the posture of their particular claims.
The creditor may request that the court set aside the fraudulent transfer,
enjoin the transferee currently holding the property from removing it
to any act intended to hinder or delay unsecured creditors); Southern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 66
A.D.2d 178, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1978) (defining a fraudulent conveyance as failure to deal honestly,
fairly, and openly); Continental Bank v. Marcus, 242 Pa. Super. 371, 363 A.2d 1318 (1976) (finding
that actual intent may be proved through circumstantial evidence).
135. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii).
136. See id. § S(b).
137. See id.
138. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1985).
139. See U.F.T.A. § 1(7), § 1 comment 7.
140. See id. § 5(b).
141. See id. § 8(f)(1). Given the provision's focus on antecedent debt, that clarification seems
tautological.
142. /d. § 8(t)(3).
143. /d. § 8(t)(2), (3).
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from the reach of the creditor, or appoint a custodian of the property. 144
Under the UFCA, only creditors with unmatured claims could request a
court to enjoin a transfer or appoint a receiver to protect the property
until the creditors' claims matured. 145 Decisions construing the UFCA,
however, have ignored the distinction and have granted anticipatory as
well as present relief to all creditors. 146 The UFIA officially eliminates
the "confusing and unnecessary distinction between matured and unmatured claims, allowing any creditor to pursue any of the above forms of
relief." 147 Under both acts a judgment creditor also may disregard a
fraudulent transaction and directly attach or levy execution on the fraudulently transferred property. 148 Even though the judgment creditor may
pursue this alternative, practical considerations may discourage actions
against the property before the fraudulent transfer is set aside. When a
court finds, after attachment, that a challenged conveyance was not in
fact fraudulent, an impatient creditor could face tort liability for wrongful attachment or conversion. 149 On the other hand, the UFfA permits
a defrauded creditor to seek a money judgment from any transferee of
the debtor's property.l 50 If the transferee has dissipated the property,
creditors cannot locate the property, or the property is otherwise beyond
the reach of creditors, a creditor may attempt to satisfy a claim from any
144. See id. § 7(a).
145. Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Matured.
(I) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his
claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without
knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or
mediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annuled to the extent necessary to
satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed.
U.F.C.A. § 9.
Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Not Matured.
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
has not matured, he may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction against any person against
whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured, and the court may,
(a) Restrain. the defendant from disposing of his property,
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
{d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require.
/d. § 10.
146. See, e.g., Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 141 A. 402 {1928) (granting injunction to
judgment creditor); Matthews v. Schusheim, 36 Misc. 2d 918, 235 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(granting injunction and allowing receiver without regard to maturity of claim); Oliphant v. Moore,
155 Tenn. 359, 293 S.W. 541 (1927) (granting injunction to tort judgment creditor).
147. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note.
148. Compare id. § 7(b) with U.F.C.A. § 9(b).
149. See Rice v. Wood, 61 Ark. 442, 33 S.W. 636 (1896) (holding creditor liable for obtaining
attachment of property not belonging to debtor); Dyett v. Hyman, 129 N.Y. 351, 29 N .E. 261 (1891)
(creditors who attached property after alleged fraudulent conveyance held liable for wrongful attachment; court upheld underlying transaction as valid}; Peterson v. Wiesner, 62 Nev. 184, 146 P.2d 789
(1944) (permitting owner of property wrongfully attached to recover for wrongful deprivation of
property).
ISO. See U.F.T.A. § 8(b)(2).
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party who received the property after the fraudulent transaction. 151 The
UFfA limits the right to recover a money judgment to the lesser of the
transferred property value or the amount of the creditor's claim. 152
The UFfA remedies do not limit the other common law or statutory remedies available to a defrauded unsecured creditor. 153 The
UFfA, like the prior uniform Act, merely provides an additional remedy
to the wronged unsecured creditor. 154
C

Rights of Transferees

The UFfA protects good faith purchasers for value. 155 This protection is available even when the debtor's subjective intent is malicious and
fraudulent. 156 When the transferee gives inadequate consideration for a
debtor's property, the new Act prot~cts the good faith transferee to the
extent of the value actually given to the debtor. 157 This partial protection
151. Jd.
152. Jd. § 8(b). The UFTA calculates property value from the time of transfer, subject to equitable adjustment. See id. § 8(c).
153. See id. § 1 comment 2, § 4 comment 8.
154. Courts have interpreted the UFCA to leave the law of bulk sales intact (see Keedy v.
Sterling Elec. Appliance Co., 13 Del. Ch. 66, 115 A. 359 (1921); Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co. v.
Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A. 355 (1928); Lewis Brown Co. v. Mallory, 8 Tenn. App. 36 (1928)), to
leave a state bulk mortgages law intact (see Rice v. Katz, 255 Mich. 1, 237 N.W. 27 (1931)), and to
uphold the common law doctrine of fraudulent retention of possession (see American S.S. Co. v.
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F.2d 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), affd, 49 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1931); Wightman v. King, 31 Ariz. 89, 250 P. 772 (1926); Ship1er v. New Castle Paper Prods. Corp., 293 Pa. 412,
143 A. 182 (1928)).
The UFTA also clarifies the rights of creditors by providing, for the first time, a statute of
limitations, see U.F.T.A. § 9, and a means to calculate when the period of limitations should begin,
see id. § 6. The new Act supplies a general four-year limitation period, subject to two exceptions.
First, creditors may bring intentional fraud claims within one year of the fraud's discovery if that
time is outside the general limitation period. Second, creditors may challenge preferential transfers
to insiders only within a one-year period. See id. The UFfA adopted the formulas for determining
the "time of transfer" (when to begin running of the limitation period) from section 548(d)(l) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(l) (1982), amended in II U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(1) (West Supp.
1985). The time of transfer in real property transactions is the time of recordation. U.F.T.A.
§ 6(1)(i) comment I. For personal property and fixtures transactions, the transfer occurs at notice
filing or delivery of physical possession. ld. § 6(l)(ii) comment I. When the parties fail to perfect
transactions that the parties could have perfected by one of the above means, the UFTA deems the
transaction to have taken place immediately before an action to set aside the fraudulent conveyance
commenced. /d. § 6(2). The UFTA provides that all other transfers occur when the transaction
becomes effective between the parties themselves. Id. § 6(3).
155. See U.F.T.A. § 8(a). The UFCA provides identical protection. Defrauded creditors may
recover "against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud
at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a
purchaser." U.F.C.A. § 9.
156. See Shay v. Gagne, 275 Mass. 386, 393, 176 N.E. 200, 202 (1931) (refusing to set aside
challenged mortgage when mortgagee did not participate in debtor's fraudulent intent); Berger v. HiGear Tire & Auto Supply, Inc., 257 Md. 470, 475, 263 A.2d 507, 510 (1970) (finding that debtor's
fraudulent intent will not vitiate transaction unless grantee participates in fraudulent intent); Bolten
v. Colburn, 389 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. App. 1965) (purchaser from fraudulent debtor protected
when the purchaser buys without notice of intent and for valuable consideration).
157. See U.F.T.A. § 8(d). The UFCA provided similar partial protection for good faith purchasers. U.F.C.A. § 9(2). See Merchants Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc., 297 Mass. 517, 520,
9 N.E.2d 528, 531 ( 1937) (innocent purchaser protected to amount of consideration paid); Osawa v.
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may take the form of a lien on the property transferred or a reduced
judgment against the transferee. 158 The UFTA protects a good faith
transferee who has not given reasonably equivalent value by enforcing
the debtor's obligation to the transferee only to the extent of value given
the debtor! 59 The UFTA protection of good faith transferees for value
also is available for subsequent transferees that did not deal directly with
the debtor. 160 The UFTA derived the provision protecting subsequent
transferees from section 550(b)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code! 61 Congress
has interpreted the bankruptcy provision as precluding a fraudulent
transferee from "laundering" a debtor's property through an innocent
party. 162 Subsequent transferees under the bankruptcy provision each
must prove good faith to avoid liability! 63
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE UFTA TO ISSUES IMPLICATED IN
PARTICULAR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

Because it adopts and occasionally reformulates several bodies of
fraud law, the UFTA is to some extent a patchwork. The first portion of
this article has described how the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 inspired the UFTA. Drafters of uniform law should consult
and incorporate established commercial concepts; they should not
reinvent the wheel at each opportunity. But patchwork legislation has its
dangers. The incongruities and inconsistencies of existing law may undermine coherent application of new law. As the drafters of the UCC
recognized, the successful promulgation of new legislation may require
that the drafters abandon the language and formulations of the existing
law to effectuate the needs of the commercial community. Professor
Frederick Beutel criticized the UCC for its variety of new and unfamiliar
terms. 164 Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of the Code, reOnishi, 33 Wash. 2d 546, 558-59, 206 P.2d 498, 505 (1949) (good faith purchaser recovers amount
paid from interpleader fund) .
158. U.F.T.A. § 8(d)(1), (3).
159. /d. § 8(d)(2).
160. See id. § 8(b)(2).
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(l) (1982).
162. E.g., 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, ~ 550.03, at 550-10 (citing Analysis of H.R. 8200, H. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977); Analysis ofS. 2266, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
90 (1978)).
163. See id; Coleman v. Home Savings Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 836 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982).
164. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [7] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE
L.J. 334, 337-48 (1952) ("If the needs ofthe regulation of commerce required it, lawyers, courts and
business men could probably learn this new vocabulary. It would perhaps take a period of twentyfive or fifty years of confusion . . . ." /d. at 348). Commentators more recently have directed
criticism toward the proposed New Uniform Payments Code, New Uniform Payments Code (Perm.
Editorial Bd. Draft No. 3, 1983), which would revise Articles 3 & 4 of the UCC. See Geary, One
Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a Good Idea?, 9 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 337, 341 (1983) ("[H]aving mastered these legal1anguages, should we all now be forced to forget
them and learn Esperanto?"). But see Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification
of Payments Law, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 103 (1984) (arguing that "[c]ommercial attorneys have
been willing to relearn" where beneficial new legislation is involved) (citing Llewellyn, Why We Need
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 367, 368 (1957)).
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sponded that the new terminology would not alter established commercial practices as much as the terminology would clarify troublesome
problem areas and avoid the unfortunate baggage attending some of the
terms under pre-Code law. 165 This section of the article fo~uses on the
language of the UFfA and the new Act's adoption of concepts from
other bodies of commercial law.
This effort does not attempt to appraise the ultimate success or failure of the UFfA project. Indeed, nearly thirty years after the final draft
of the UCC the debate over the success of that jurisprudential experiment persists. 166 Nonetheless, as situations conducive to fraudulent
transfer analysis confront courts and legislative bodies, some observations regarding the new uniform Act's provisions may guide the interpretive process and inform the debate over the desirability of the UFfA's
formulation of fraudulent transfer law. This section of the article examines specific provisions of the UFfA. to consider the statute's essential
characteristics. The reader who appreciates the manner in which the
drafters drew distinctions and accentuated similarities has the frame of
reference to construe the UFfA's provisions.
The drafters of the new Act identify the crucial concept upon which
the law of fraudulent transactions is premised: "the purpose of the Act
[is] to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the
debtor's unsecured creditors." 167 That purpose is not the exclusive province of the UFfA or its predecessor statute. The preference provision of
the Bankruptcy Code proscribed transfers which operate "to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims . . . ." 168 Succinctly,
fraudulent transfer law endeavors to regulate nothing more. To conclude
that fraudulent transfer legislation absolutely penalizes debtor actions
which benefit some creditors at the expense of others would be to oversimplify; the necessary accommodation of competing financial interests
and freedom of contract principles assures the continued integrity of
165. See Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J.
364, 379 (1952). See also id. at 367 ("[There] are novel terms [in the UCC]: they have not previously been statutory words of art. On the other hand it would be hard to imagine that either a
businessman or a lawyer would find them 'strange . . . technical and exotic."') (quoting Beutel,
supra note 164, at 337-38).
166. Compare Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21
STAN. L. REV. 621,635 (1975) ("This derogation of the legislative function [implicit in the UCC)
appears to be premised on . . . (a] triad of dubious assumptions . . . .") with Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial Code: A "Commote," 31 Sw. L.J. 843, 866 (1977) (in which
Professor Winship, having reviewed Professor Danzig's effort, concludes that " Danzig's dichotomy
between the proper roles for courts and legislatures oversimplifies both Llewellyn's approach to
semi-permanent legislation and the characteristics of the provisions of article 11."). Other examples
of the debate over the success of the UCC are available. See, e.g., Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of
which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's
Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 139 (1970); Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
167. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985). See
infra note 197 for a reproduction of section 547(c).
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many transactions which some affected third parties would reasonably
conclude are prejudicial to their best interests.
A statutory proscription of particular transactions or of transactions
with particular consequences must offer a catalog of indicia to signal reliably those transfers that invidiously sacrifice some interests in favor of
others. The laws must hold the "dirty guys" in without unduly inhibiting the regularity and predictability of commercial transactions. 169
Achieving the best balance of general and specific terminology to assure
commercially reasonable results is a significant challenge. The UFfA
can be no better than the drafters' success in achieving the balance; the
new Act suffers most when general policies are sacrificed for the pyrrhic
security of overspecification.

A.

Specificity and Generalization

Like too many "matters legal," 170 courts and commentators can
sense fraud more easily than define it. 171 As noted above, the drafters of
fraud law agree on its purpose-avoiding transactions which prejudice
the interests of unsecured creditors. How best to effectuate that purpose,
however, is unclear. The UFfA approaches the challenge from two perspectives. The Act generalizes by means of broad definition and specifies
by reference to more precise indicia. This article suggests that the UFfA
may change the law without improving it because the new Act lacks internal consistency. The new uniform law vacillates when treating certain
transactions and fails to achieve the proper balance of the general and the
specific to assure coherent, consistent application of the Act's provisions.

1.

Generalization: The UFTA Concept of "Transfer"

The UFfA offers a broad definition of "transfer," 172 designed such
that courts may apply the Act's avoidance mechanisms to virtually any
type of transaction which could prejudice unsecured creditors. Section 6
of the UFfA, which designates the time at which a transfer is made or
an obligation incurred, complements well the broad section 1(12) defini169. See Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953). As Llewellyn himself more stylishly put it:
The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do, and you assume within reason
that the persons the law deals with will try to be decent; then after that, you lay down the edges
to take care of the dirty guys and try to hold them in, which means that every statute ought to
have two essential bases, one to show you where the law wants you to go, and one to show
where we will put you if you don't.
ld. (quoted in Carroll, supra note 166, at 152).
170. Llewellyn was suspicious of any attempt to frame all-inclusive definitions of "law." SeeK.
LLEWELLYN, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE 3-5 (1962) ("I have no
desire to exclude anything from matters legal." Jd. at 4).
171. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today
attempt further to define [hard-core pornography) . . . . But I know it when I see it . .. .");Letter
from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaims, supra note 2 and accompanying text (in which Lord Hardwicke despairs of framing any legal definition of fraud).
172. See U.F.T.A. § 1(12).
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tion of transfer. 173 As discussed above, 174 the comprehensiveness of the
transfer concept made possible the fraudulent conveyance analysis of the
Durrett line of cases. Comment 12 to UFfA section 1(12) acknowledges
that the Act's definition "is derived principally from § 101 [48] of the
Bankruptcy Code," 175 and further explains that the Code's definition is
no less comprehensive than that of the UFCA. Courts have held that the
UFCA definition includes involuntary transfers such as foreclosure sales
in several cited cases. 176
So long as the new Act's provisions reach involuntary transfers of
the debtor's assets, the Durrett analysis retains its vitality. In UFfA section 3(b), clarifying the reasonably equivalent value concept, the drafters
try· to avoid the Durrett result explicitly by providing that transfers "pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale" 177 are necessarily transfers for reasonably equivalent value. The drafters are
comfortable, then, in concluding that a regularly conducted foreclosure
sale could not, as a matter of law, deplete the debtor's estate to the prejudice of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Creative counsel and judges,
however, may construe the ffregu/arly conducted, noncol/usive" language
of UFTA section 3(b) to reach a result similar to that accomplished by
the Durrett rule. Counsel can argue that the sale was conducted irregularly, or was collusive. If such an argument succeeds, then the provision
would have no more effect than UCC section 9-507(2). 178 This UCC
section admonishes that a party cannot assail an Article 9 sale of property subject to a security interest merely because "a better price could
173. See id. § 6.
174. See supra notes 70-75, and 111-14 and accompanying text.
175. U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 12; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(48) (1985). This section of the
Bankruptcy Code states: "(48) 'transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest." /d.
176. See U.F.T.A . § 1 comment 12 (citing Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N .Y. 139, 27 N .E.2d
814 (1940); Lefkowitz v. Finkelstein Trading Corp., 14 F. Supp. 898, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Catabene
v. Wallner, 16 N.J. Super. 597, 602, 85 A.2d 300, 302 (1951); Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co.,
277 A.D. 1090, 101 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 932, 100 N .E.2d 189 (1951)).
177. U.F.T.A. § 3(b); see id. § 3 comment 5 (in which the drafters state that they have rejected
the rule of Durrett in favor of that espoused in In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982),
aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984)). For a discussion of Madrid and Durrett, see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
178. Section 9-507(2) of the UCC provides:
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either
sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the
price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in
a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A disposition
which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or
representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this
sentence does not indicate that any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it
indicate that any disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable.
u.c.c. § 9-507(2) (1978).
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have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method
from that selected by the secured party." 179 In several instances, courts
have reviewed foreclosure sales which left the debtor owing a substantial
deficiency and have found a basis other than a low price to upset the sale.
These courts have found ways to conclude that the sale was commercially unreasonable. 180
Although in defining transfer 181 the UFf A considers all of the facts
surrounding a conveyance of a property interest, this article skeptically
:views the effect which courts will give the section 3(b) definition of
value.l 82 To the extent section 3(b) compromises the broad parameters
of the transfer definition, the section may allow courts to reach a Durrettlike result. The regression from the broad transfer definition at least is
unfortunate and could prove inefficacious.

2.

Specification: The u/nsider,, Transferee
a. "Insider" Status

The UFfA's insider definition is dichotomous. Subsection 1(7)(iv)
provides that the term insider "includes . . . an affiliate, or an insider of
an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor . . . ." 183 Section 1(1) defines affiliate. 184 Because the Act uses the intention_ally nonexclusive "includes" modifier in describing what constitutes insider status, 185
understanding why the drafters specify the intercorporate and interper179. /d.
180. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Div., 540 F.2d 1375, 1381-82 (lOth
Cir. 1976) (holding the sale of oil drilling rig commercially unreasonable in part due to a lack of
publicity and auction irregularities, but noting the low price received as a factor); Connex Press, Inc.
v. International Airmotive, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 51,56-57 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding the sale of large jet
commercially unreasonable due in part to inadequate publicity, but identifying the low price received
in sale as factor in decision), affd without opinion, 514 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Atlas Constr. Co.
v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 124 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965) (inadequate publicity
combined with below-market sales price established sale of truck crane as commercially unreasona·
ble). See generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM·
MERCIAL CODE ~ 4.8[8][a] (1980) (discussing the effect on courts of low foreclosure sale prices).
Clark notes that while "a low price received at foreclosure is not fatal . . . , a low price calls for a
close review of the facts surrounding the sale." Id at 4-66. Indeed, Clark discusses some authority
in which courts have determined, in apparent opposition to the language of section 9-507(2), that
receipt of a low foreclosure sale price alone can mark such a sale as commercially unreasonable. See
id. at~ 4.8[8][b] (citing, e.g., Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d 12, 119 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1975); Family Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 587, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 647
(Pa. Ct. C.P. 1961)). Clark cautions, however, that "[j]ust as the courts weigh the price received
heavily when other elements of commercial unreasonableness are present, so will they frequently
uphold a low price when the sale passes muster in all other respects." /d. at 4-68. See also AMERI·
CAN BAR AssociATION, CONDUCTING A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE SALE OF COLLATERAL
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, A PANEL PRESENTATION FOR THE
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW (Aug. 1, 1983) (describing requisites of
a commercially reasonable disposition).
181. See U.F .T.A. § 1(12).
182. See id. § 3(b).
183. /d. § 1(7)(iv).
184. See id. § 1(1).
185. The UFTA follows the Bankruptcy Code and specifies that includes is not to be read in a
limiting fashion. See U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 7 ("As in the Bankruptcy Code . . . , the word 'in-
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sonal relationships which should arouse courts' suspicion in some detail
is difficult. Courts will apply more careful scrutiny to transactions with
relatives, general partners, 186 partnerships, directors, officers, and persons in control 187 of the debtor. 188 Insider transfers certainly warrant
that treatment, but whether the UFfA drafters made the reasons requiring exceptional treatment of such transactions fully operative is unclear.
Parties in a position to compel or cajole transfer of the debtor's
property to themselves are insiders, the parties particularly well-postured
to receive the estate's property to the prejudice of unsecured creditors. A
debtor will convey or transfer its property to particular third parties and
thereby prejudice unsecured creditors, as the debtor and the transferee
will benefit more from such an action than from an equitable disposition
of the property. Either the debtor foresees some direct pecuniary benefit
to itself in the transfer or prefers to benefit a particular transferee or
group of transferees for less commercially obvious reasons. In any event,
if the debtor transfers its assets to one creditor rather than to another
creditor for reasons which do not reciprocally enhance the pecuniary
value of the debtor's estate, then the transfer may be voidable because
"[c]onsideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not
satisfy the statutory definition [of value]." 189
As Holmes suggested, courts can draw conclusions about relevant
subjective circumstances more confidently when the courts receive sufficient objective indicia. 190 Because the context is more susceptible to
eludes' is not limiting, however."); 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1982) ('"includes' and 'including' are not
limiting").
186. The UFfA, however, excludes limited partners from the insider definition. See U.F.T.A.
§§ 1(7)(i)(C), 1(7)(ii)(E), 1(7)(iii)(D), § I comment 7. The comment states, in pertinent part, that
while the UFfA derives its insider definition from the Bankruptcy Code,
[t)he definition has been restricted . .. [in the UFfA) to make clear that a partner is not an
insider of an individual, corporation, or partnership if any of these latter three persons is only a
limited partner. The [Bankruptcy Code] definition . . . does not purport to make a limited
partner an insider . . ., but it is susceptible of a contrary interpretation and one which would
extend unduly the scope of the defined relationship when the limited partner is not a person in
control of the partnership.
/d. § 1 comment 7. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (1985) (the Bankruptcy Code definition of "insider" status).
187. U.F.T.A. § 1(7)(iii)(E).
188. For a discussion of the "control" concept, see Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus.
LAW. 343 (1975). Douglas-Hamilton discusses the ways in which a court may find a creditor "in
control" of corporate debtors, primarily in the context of federal securities law. She identifies three
situations in which courts may find creditor liability: first, when a creditor may exercise voting
control over the corporate debtor by having the power to elect a majority of directors (as where a
controlling block of shares serves as loan collateral); second, when a creditor has significant control
over the selection of the personnel who will manage the troubled debtor; and, finally, when the
creditor can influence either the debtor's management or those persons with voting control through
financial domination. /d. at 344-46. See also Ash & Broude, The Consequences of Lender Control, in
LEVERAGED BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 205 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979) (citing DouglasHamilton as reviving the doctrine of lender control).
189. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2.
190. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 33. ("(W]hile the law . . . always, in a certain sense,
measure[s] legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless . . . is continually transmuting those
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overreaching and commercially unreasonable behavior, courts scrutinize
insider transfers. Experience suggests that insiders may take undue advantage of unsecured creditor's interests. 191 If the substance of and reason for the insider and affiliate formulations in the UFfA is this
subjective idea of undue advantage, then the Act gains little by describing
insider status in precise, specific, even formalistic terms. Moreover, if the
reason behind the rule is insubstantial and application of the terminology
supersedes contextual analysis, then the object of the legislation may be
compromised and application of its provisions becomes awkward. Parties able to exert improper influence on the debtor may escape insider
status, as the UFfA may not specify these parties' particular relation to
the debtor. The problem with the UFfA's treatment of insiders goes
beyond the definitional provisions. The new Act inconsistently applies
the policies implicated in insider transactions and therefore undermines
courts' ability to apply the new Act coherently. The next section of this
article describes the UFfA's ambivalent treatment of certain transfers to
insiders.
b.

Preferential Transfers to Insiders

Section 5(b) of the UFfA renders voidable transfers by a debtor to
an insider made "for other than a present, reasonably equivalent value"
when the debtor was insolvent and the transferee "had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent." 192 In comment 3 to the section, the
drafters explain that "[a]voidance of the ... transfer without reference
to the [transferee's] state of mind and the nature of the consideration
exchanged would be unduly harsh treatment of the creditors of the
[transferee] and unduly favorable to the creditors of the [debtor]." 193
That explanation undermines the detailed definition of insider; the drafters, by directing that courts afford the transferee's state of mind due deference, have frustrated the provision's utility. The comment's reference
to the insider transferee's state of mind and the section 5(b) reference to
the insider transferee's reasonable belief sacrifice any certainty and premoral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is
wholly eliminated."); cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
writing for the Court) ("[W]e are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear
it should be laid down once for all by the Courts."). But cf. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105
(1934) (Cardozo, J., writing for the Court) ("The need (for caution in framing standards of conduct]
is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have
emerged.").
191. See In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (secured claims of a
creditor "in control" of the debtor corporation subordinated), re-v'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (discussed in Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 188, at
349-50); In re American Lumber Co., 7 Bankr. 519 (D. Minn. 1979) (debtor's post-default grant of
security interest to creditor, and the creditor's subsequent exercise of liquidation powers and management control, was preferential, fraudulent, and resulted in subordination of secured creditor's
claims to unsecured creditors).
192. U.F.T.A. § 5(b).
193. /d. § 5 comment 3.
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dictability that the detailed insider definition provides. The nature of insider status implies that once the court characterizes a transferee as an
insider the transferee necessarily had reasonable cause to question the
debtor's solvency.
In sections 1(7) and S(b) the UFfA fluctuates between a specific and
a general stance. Although an area as amorphous as fraud law is perhaps
best defined in general terms to allow courts the flexibility necessary to
proscribe a large number of transactions circumscribed only by the limits
of creditors' ingenuity, good commercial reasons for specificity remain.
The vagaries of post hoc characterization should not unduly hamper
commercial transactions. Attorneys should be able to explain to sophisticated clients whether and to what extent a court may scrutinize a particular transaction as an insider transaction. The balance is a difficult
one to strike for all cases at all times. However the drafters may ultimately resolve the tension between a specific and a general position,
fraud law must treat insiders consistently. The Act's insider provisions
should be unequivocal; they should not alternate between affording insiders favored and suspect creditor status. But the drafters of the UFTA are
inconsistent. The statute seems to permit contextual, fact-determinative
analysis by reference to objective indicia. On the other hand, the statute
inexplicably reverses direction and refers to the transactors' state of mind
and reasonable belief.
Another section of the Act treats insiders inconsistently. Although
the UFTA characterizes particular transactions as fraudulent and provides consequently for punitive consequences, the drafters leave open a
safety-valve: section 8 permits some transferees to plead and prove their
good faith and to recover the less than reasonably equivalent value they
have given the debtor. That recovery is unavailable to the insider transferee who took on account of an antecedent debt, for less than reasonably
equivalent value, from an insolvent debtor, when the insider had "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." The comments to
section 8(d) conclude in terms not found in the text of the Act that:
An insider who receives property or an obligation from an insolvent debtor as security for or in satisfaction of an antecedent debt
of the transferor or obligor is not a good faith transferee or obligee if.
the insider has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred. 194
Therefore, section 8(d) does not protect an insider transferee. This result
seems consistent with the commercial consequences of insider status.
The Act presumes such transferees are culpable without providing an
opportunity to prove their good faith. Once again, however, the UFf A
vacillates.
194.

/d. § 8 comment 4.
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Subsection 8(f) complements 8(d). The former refers specifically to
section 5(b) insider preferences:
(8)(f) A transfer is not voidable under section 5(b):
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of
the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was
secured by a valid lien;
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the insider; or
(3) if made pursuant to a good faith effort to rehabilitate the
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose
as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor. 195
At some point in the drafting process the NCCUSL may have been comfortable without section 8(f) because the subsection as currently drafted
does not appear in early drafts of the Act. 196 The final draft includes the
subsection, however, and undermines the Act's treatment of insiders.
The comments to the subsection explain that section 8(f) adapts the
Bankruptcy Code section 547(c) preference provisions. 197 Subsection
195. /d. § 8(f).
196. See U.F.T.A. § 8(f) (Proposed Draft 1984) (copy on file at the University of Illinois Law
Review office). In this earlier draft, § 8(f) stated: "A creditor may not recover under subsection
(b)(2) from a good-faith transferee or obligee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee
or obligee." /d.
197. See U.F.T.A. § 8 comment 6. Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(1) to the extent that such transfer was(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was
made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
{2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such
property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor
gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor( A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable
transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of
either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies,
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
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8(t)(l) and (2) are consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. In contrast,
subsection 8(f)(3) is new and, with UFfA section 6(4), is more favorable
to the interests of commercial lenders than are the Bankruptcy Code
provisions. 198
The UFfA and Bankruptcy Code conflict over the troubled debtors'
"feeding-the-lien" of the secured lender, thus improving the secured
creditor's position by exercising an "after-acquired property" 199 clause.
A hypothetical explains how parties can accomplish this transaction and
clarifies the difference between the UFfA and the Bankruptcy Code:
Debtor enters into a loan and security agreement with Bank.
Debtor grants Bank a security interest in all of Debtor's accounts
receivable "now or hereafter received by or belonging to Debtor for
goods sold by it or services rendered by it to secure repayment of the
loan and any attorney's fees incurred by Bank in collecting the
loan." The loan advances cannot exceed 60 percent of the total of
the accounts outstanding. On October 1, Debtor borrows $60,000
and has outstanding accounts of $100,000, creating a "collateral
cushion" of $40,000. As of February 1, Debtor owes Bank $55,000
on the loan but only $50,000 of outstanding accounts exists. At this
point, Bank is undersecured and a $5,000 deficiency exists. By
March 1, however, once more $100,<X>O of outstanding accounts exist and Debtor owes the Bank only $60,000. Bank's position has
improved between February 1 and March 1.
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Bank would receive a voidable preferential transfer to the extent Debtor reduced the deficiency during the ninety days (or, if Bank is an insider, one year) before Debtor files
the bankruptcy petition. That is the improvement of position, or twopoint test. 200
The Bankruptcy Code section presumes that the Bank's improved
position is preferential despite the Bank's good faith. 201 Section 8(f) of
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating
such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title;
or
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the
aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West Supp. 1985).
198. The applicable Bankruptcy Code section is 547(e)(3), which provides that "(t]or the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor bas acquired rights in the property
transferred." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1982). Both the Bankruptcy Code and the UFfA, therefore,
provide that a transfer occurs when a debtor acquires rights in the collateral See U.F.T .A . § 6(4).
199. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1978).
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982), amended in 11 U .S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985)
(reproduced in note 197, supra). See generally 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL~ 547.10(5) (L.
King 3d ed. 1985) {discussing the "improvement in position" test in section 547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code).
201. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985) (containing no reference to the "good
faith" of the creditor).

No.3]

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACf

557

the UFTA provides that the good faith of the Bank is relevant. Indeed,
good faith would insulate from avoidance an improved position accomplished by an after-acquired property clause. 202 So long as the Bank improves its position (enhances its collateral base) in return for present
value-new advances given to rehabilitate the Debtor--courts cannot
void the transfer. The UFTA does not require that the new advance
equal the amount of the after-acquired property, the collateral which becomes subject to the Bank's security interest. If the future advance does
equal the amount of the after-acquired property, then section 5(b) will
not proscribe the transfer (Debtor's acquired rights in the collateral subject to the Bank's security interest)203 because it does not result from an
antecedent debt. Section 8(t)(3) therefore does more than insulate transfers of after-acquired property in exchange for matching new value. The
section also permits the Bank to improve its position to the prejudice of
unsecured creditors under the guise of rehabilitating the Debtor. The
UFTA accomplishes this result by not incorporating the Bankruptcy
Code's two-point test. This result is manifestly pro-financial institution
and suggests that unsecured creditors may lose an important safeguard
against fraudulent transfers unless they can refute the fraudulent transferee's protest of good faith. 204 Moreover, deferring to the rights of insiders further compromises the UFTA's treatment of parties uniquely
postured to exert control over fiscally unsound debtors. Section 8(t) particularly is troublesome because of the timing of its inclusion in the draft
UFTA. The provision was not in the draft submitted to the Commissioners at the beginning of the Colorado meeting. Nevertheless, section
8(t) appeared in the draft which emerged from the Conference only seven
days later. 205
B.

The Insolvency Requirement.

Although the UFTA proscribes transactions executed "with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor" without
reference to the solvency of the debtor/transferor, 206 transactions accompanied by less insidious mens rea are subject to avoidance only when the
debtor is insolvent before or after the transfer. 207 This formulation retains standard, familiar, fraudulent conveyance law. This article assumes
that by focusing on the debtor's solvency to distinguish between transactions which merely injure rather than utterly destroy the debtor's fiscal
202. See U.F.T.A. § 8(t).
203. See id. § 6(4).
204. The drafters of the UFTA, while expressly providing creditors with the "good faith" exception, apparently have permitted courts to allocate the burden of proof on the issue. Neither the
applicable UFTA section nor the comment to that section discusses the matter. See U.F.T.A.
§ 8(f)(3); id. § 8 comment 6.
205. Copies of preliminary drafts are on file at the University of Illinois Law Review office.
206. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l) (1984).
207. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text; U .F .T.A. § 5. See also supra notes 126-35
and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. § 4(a) (discussing other forms of constructive fraud).
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integrity, proponents of fraudulent transfer law mean to limit the transactions which are presumptively avoidable. Ex post facto review of all
the debtor's transactions would spawn too much litigation and compromise too many deals from the vantage offered only by hindsight.
Although courts will punish intentional wrongdoing, complaining creditors must either prove such intent or establish the insolvency of the
debtor.
The drafters of the UFTA acknowledged (indeed codified) the difficulty of establishing subjective bad intent by cataloging the indicia of
·control in the insider and affiliate definitions. 208 In deciding which transactions should be subject to avoidance, however, the insolvency of the
transferor may not matter. Further, insolvency analysis may confuse the
purpose and operation of fraudulent transfer law. To reach a conclusion
regarding the efficacy of the insolvency criterion, this article considers
two important commercial contexts in which fraudulent conveyance
analysis has received attention.

1.

Upstream and Cross-stream Guaranty Relationships

Upstream guaranties arise when a subsidiary corporation guaranties
its parent's indebtedness; cross-stream guaranties describe a corporation's guaranty of an affiliated corporate debtor, such as one subsidiary's
guaranty of another subsidiary's performance. 209 Professor Rosenberg
has suggested that the two types of guaranty contracts entail the guarantor's (debtor's) assumption of a liability, the guaranty obligation, without
the realization of a counterbalancing asset. 210 Therefore, the debtor executes an upstream or cross-stream guaranty "without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the . . . obligation." 211 Then, so
long as the debtor is insolvent, state or federal fraudulent conveyance law
applies and the guaranty contract is subject to avoidance.
Insolvency analysis exposes the metaphysics of this type of fraudulent conveyance attack. Creditors who take upstream and cross-stream
guaranties argue that the solvency of the debtor should not be in issue
because when the subsidiary or affiliate corporation assumes the guaranty
obligation, the guaranty's liability is necessarily offset by the concomitant
subrogation rights which the common law assures those who answer for
the debt of another. 212 Comment 2 to the UFTA section 1(2) definition
of asset provides that "a contingent claim of a surety for reimbursement,
contribution, or subrogation may be counted as an asset" in the solvency
208. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. §§ I( I), 1(7).
209. See Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law ofFraudulent Conveyances: Lender
Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 238-39 & nn.3-4 (1976).
210. See id. at 256.
211. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2).
212. See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp.),
578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[C]ontingent subrogation and contribution rights must be valued
as assets in determining solvency.").
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calculus. 213 Professor Rosenberg argues, however, that
[t]he notion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a contingent asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic;
when and if the guarantor is called upon to perform, the value of
that contingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely
because it probably would be no longer collectible. Otherwise, the
guarantor would not have been called upon to perform. 214
The courts now consider the valuation of contingent subrogation and
contribution rights without embracing the Rosenberg analysis. 215 Commentators, notably those promoting the positions of creditors who take
the upstream or cross-stream guaranty, are likewise less receptive to arguments which question the valuation of subrogation rights.2 16 From the
perspective of the drafters of fraudulent transfer law, however, the debate's outcome and the courts' valuation of subrogation rights should not
be quite as interesting as the cause for all of the fuss: creditors who have
given nothing tangible, no "hard" corporeal assets, to a
debtor/guarantor seek to uphold the guaranty contract, often secured by
real and personal property, because executing the guaranty does not
render the debtor/guarantor insolvent. Such creditors can make such an
argument, and fend off fraudulent conveyance attack, only because the
drafters of fraudulent conveyance law have decided that solvency matters. Because the issue is apposite only when the transaction rendered
the debtor insolvent, or left the debtor with "unreasonably small capital
[assets)," 217 lenders who take upstream and cross-stream guaranties can
avoid confronting the "reasonably equivalent value" issue.
Understood in the context of the essential purpose of fraud law and
properly construed, the reference to unreasonably small assets should be
sufficient to function as uniform legislation on this topic. The enigma,
then, is why the UFTA retains the insolvency idea in section 5(a). The
concept has outlived its usefulness in a complex financial world where
solvency analyses are more matters of professional opinion than fixed,
verifiable measures. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code acknowledged
and codified the flexible valuation determinations. 218 The real problem
213. U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 2.
214. Rosenberg, supra note 209, at 256 (emphasis added).
215. See. e.g., Manufacturers v. Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip.
Corp.), 578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Comm'r, 560 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1977);
Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co.,
53 F.2d 369, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1931); Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660, 662 (4th Cir.), cen.
denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. Jefferson Sales & Distribs., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 659,
672 (S.D. Miss. 1971), affd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Bowers, 215 F. 617-18
(N.D. Ga. 1914).
216. See Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions,
61 N.C.L. REv. 655, 679-82 (citing and quoting Coquillette, Guaranty ofand Security for the Debt of
a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 433, 438-46 (1980)).
217. U.F .C.A. § 5.
218. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 9Sth Cong., 2d Sess. 178 {1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138 (describes the previous preference provision of the Bankruptcy
Code as including "several impediments to the proper functioning" of the provision, among which
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with confusing fraud law by retaining the insolvency standard in section
5(a) alongside the unreasonably small assets test, section 4(a)(2)(i), is that
the objective indicia of section 5 may overcome the more subjective inquiry of section 4 and may insulate some transfers by creating a safe
harbor.
Counsel for a creditor who has received an upstream or cross-stream
guaranty would argue that relying on the unreasonably small assets standard eviscerates the specificity, certainty, and predictability of the section
5 insolvency requisite. Counsel would urge a court to focus, instead, on
the debtor's solvency. Indeed, the fact that the unsecured creditors of
the debtor/guarantor are in court challenging the guaranty makes the
argument that the debtor retained unreasonably small assets easy, even
tautological. If the debtor had sufficient assets, then the complaining
creditors would have satisfied their claims without judicial intervention.
To preclude such circular analysis, courts may have to construe the unreasonably small assets language by referring to objective criteria: the
balance sheets of the debtor/guarantor. As the next section of the article
illustrates, however, the "certainty" offered by financial statements is
ephemeral at best, manipulable at worst.

2.

Leveraged Business Acquisitions

Although the potential factual contexts vary, the leveraged business
acquisition is sufficiently general to support observations which accurately describe the dynamics of more than limited, isolated transactions.
A generic hypothetical is useful:
The aging management and shareholders (sellers) of a privately held
company approach a group interested in acquiring the company.
Ambition-rich but relatively cash-poor, the acquisition group arranges financing through a bank or commercial finance company.
The lender advances the loan proceeds against the assets (accounts
receivable, inventory, equipment, real property) of the acquired
company. The acquisition group pays for the sellers' interest in cash
(and perhaps a promissory note). Sellers transfer ownership of the
company and its assets to the acquisition group subject to the security and perhaps mortgage interest of the lender. The individual
members of the acquisition group, at the insistence of the secured
lender, often will execute personal (usually secured) guaranties of
the acquisition loan. 219
One of the pitfalls of such transactions from the lender's perspective is
the potential for fraudulent conveyance challenges under state and fedwas the requirement that "the trustee prove the debtor's insolvency at the time the preferential
transfer was made").
219. Reisman, The Structure of Leveraged Acquisitions: Economic Considerations in LEVERAGED BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 9, 30-33 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979) inspired this
hypothetical.
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erallaw. One commentator notes that the transaction may prejudice the
unsecured creditors of the acquired corporation:
[W]here the acquisition takes the form of a merger or asset purchase
. . . the acquired assets simply become part of the acquiring [entity]
. . . . In such a case, where the enabling loan is secured by the
present and after-acquired assets of the acquiring [entity] . .. , the
lender has now achieved not mere parity with pre-existing creditors
but priority in the assets of the acquired corporation. 220
The commentator further explains, in terms familiar to fraudulent transfer analysis, that the net result of the transaction is to encumber the
debtor's assets "without providing a direct benefit to the corporation." 221
Practitioners' guides suggest various devices which acquisition lenders may use to preclude or limit avoidance of the security interest portion
of the leveraged acquisition as a fraudulent conveyance. 222 These guides
advise lenders' counsel to obtain appraisals, and procure cash flow and
balance sheet projections "showing ability of company to continue its
business for at least one year anp meet its assumed and future obligations
as they mature. " 223 In addition to supplying indispensable loan memorandum information, such precautions "also establish bona fides and
good faith of lender in entering into transaction in reliance upon borrower's solvency and future working capital viability." 224 Appearances
aside, here is the essence of the leveraged business acquisition transaction
from the perspective of unsecured creditors: assets to which such creditors once could look to realize their claims against the debtor corporation
are now, ostensibly, beyond their reach. The crucial element is the grant
of the subordinating security interest, not the change of ownership.
Compare this with the effect that a conventional Article 9 secured transaction has on the debtor's unsecured creditors.
Under the UFCA courts have considered the discrepancy between
the amount of a debtor's loan and the value of the collateral hypothecated by the debtor to secure the loan. 225 When the discrepancy is large,
courts are more likely to allow parties to avoid the security interest.226
The UFTA does not distinguish between absolute transfers and security
transfers: "The premise of this Act is that when a transfer is for security
only, the equity . . . remains .available to unsecured creditors and thus
cannot be regarded as the subject of a fraudulent transfer merely because
of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise valid security transfer."227 This solution of a commercial incongruity is welcome, but the
220. Rosenberg, Fraudulent Conveyance and Preference Implications of Leveraged Acquisitions,
in LEVERAGED BUSINESS ACQUISmONS 147, 151 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979).
221. /d. at 152.
222. See Reisman, supra note 219, at 26-27.
223. /d. (emphasis added}.
224. /d. at 27.
225. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
226. See cases cited supra note 100.
227. U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 3.
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fraudulent transfer analysis of conventional Article 9 secured transactions and leveraged business acquisitions remains confused. The next
sentence of the same UFf A comment creates the confusion, by explaining that "[d]isproportion between the value of the asset securing the debt
and the size of the debt secured" 228 may still raise fraud problems when
the transaction suggests "an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors"229 of the transferor. Parties may avoid, then, an Article 9 security
interest. Similarly, courts may void leveraged business acquisitions
under the UFTA because "the corporate assets and cash flow are encumbered with an obligation which was incurred without providing a direct
benefit to the corporation. " 230 The acquisition also might provide the
basis of an intentional fraud claim. Neither transaction is voidable under
UFf A section S(a), constructive fraud, however, unless the
debtor/transferor was insolvent at the time of the transaction.
The similarities between a conventional Article 9 security interest
and a leveraged business acquisition are significant from the perspective
of the debtor's unsecured creditors. One of the reasons that Article 9
secured lenders provide a collateral cushion in sophisticated loan transactions, advancing funds against only seventy to eighty percent of the
value of the assets securing the loan, is to provide an asset fund from
which parties may obtain attorneys' fees and collection expenses. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that secured creditors
may obtain reimbursement for attorneys' fees "[t]o the extent .. . [a]
secured claim is secured by property the value of which .. . is greater
than the amount of such claim . . . ." 231 Satisfaction of such obligations
in no way accrues to the direct benefit of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Because the language in the UFfA comment is contradictory, the
new Act leaves open the question whether the "[d]isproportion between
the value of the asset securing the debt and the size of the debt secured"
may be a measure of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud under the UFTA.
The extent to which the question remains open also is, arguably, a measure of the similarity between the typical Article 9 financing transaction
and the leveraged business acquisition. If courts will equate a large discrepancy with actual fraudulent intent and, also, find subjective fraud in
the context of leveraged business acquisitions, then the debtor's solvency
no longer matters-the transactions are avoidable and insolvency analysis is inapposite. Recall that the solvency of the debtor/transferor is not
in issue when a creditor attacks a transfer as intentionally fraudulent.
The UFTA does not clearly provide such a result. Instead, the
drafters vacillate. Part of the problem, perhaps its crux, is the indeterminancy of the concept of "direct" benefit. After all, businesspeople
do not brave the vicissitudes of the commercial world for the benefit of
228.
229.

230.
231.

/d.
U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1).
Rosenberg, supra note 220, at 152.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982), amended in 11 U .S.C.A. § 506(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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their creditors. Fraudulent transfer law balances benefit to the owners of
a corporation against detriment to the corporation's unsecured creditors.
The fraudulent transfer analysis in either event should focus on the transaction's commercial substance from the perspective of the transferee and
the unsecured creditors of the debtor/transferor; evaluation of the
debtor/transferor's solvency just does not seem important. Although
more aggressive use of the actual fraud provisions is necessary, the
UFTA does not accommodate such analysis. So long as the several bodies of state and federal fraudulent transfer law adopt insolvency as a certain measure, courts will refer to less consequential, more manipulable
phenomena, such as balance sheets, and will obscure the subtle fraudulent transfer balance. In both the corporate guaranty and leveraged business acquisition contexts, the ambiguity of insolvency analysis may
obscure the substance of the transaction. Courts, commentators, and
commercial attorneys focus on the calculable solvency of the
debtor/transferor. Creditors thus should keep the transferor afloat for
the duration of the applicable statute of limitations. 232 Therefore, in~ol
vency, which has become more an accountants' state of mind than an
.inevitable state of affairs, may be a relic of a less enlightened commercial
world. A business need not be insolvent to seek the protections of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.233 The concept remains only to "pr9tect" transferees. Insolvency provides a means to construct a safe harbor, as the "reasonably equivalent value" inquiry is inapposite when the
debtor was solvent at the time of the challenged transfer. By retaining
both the insolvency standard (section 5(a)), and the "unreasonably small
assets" concept (section 4(a)(2)) and reference to intentional fraud in the
context of secured transactions, the UFTA threatens to perpetuate formal rather than substantive analysis.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has presented the provisions of the UFTA and described
the way in which the new Act would adjust the rights of the parties affected by certain fraudulent transactions. Legislatures and courts must
carefully consider the dynamics of commercial transactions and think
through the way in which the UFTA would apply to allegedly fraudulent
transfers. This analysis should focus on the incentives and safe harbors
which the Act provides. This article has given careful attention to the
language of the Act because the Act will, in large part, structure transactions. The balance between specific and general terminology is crucial in
this area of commercial law. Perhaps the drafters of the UFTA did not
achieve the proper balance. Because acquiescing in the formulations
232. Courts may extinguish claims under the UFfA at various intervals, depending upon the
nature of the cause of action. See U.F.T.A. § 9.
233. See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL~ 301.03 (L. King 3d ed. 1981).
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which have obtained heretofore is inappropriate, this article views the
new Act's adoption of existing fraud principles critically.
In particular, this article questions the UFfA's treatment of insiders
and urges that the drafters reconsider the insolvency criterion in light of
contemporary commercial practices. The authors hope that this article
will provide a starting point to consider this most recent codification of
fraud law, an area of the law which legislatures should conclude is not
subject to neat formulation.
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APPENDIX
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

§ 1. Definitions
As used in this [Act]:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(i) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds
with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting
securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities,
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary
power to vote the securities; or
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised
the power to vote;
(ii) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held
with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities,
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the
securities; or
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact
exercised the power to vote;
(iii) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a
lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(iv) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease
or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's
assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but the term does not
include:
(i) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(ii) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(iii) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to
the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim
against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
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(7) "Insider" includes:
(i) if the debtor is an individual,
(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the
debtor;
(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(C) a general partner in a partnership described in clause
(B); or
(D) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer,
or person in control;
(ii) if the debtor is a corporation,
(A) a director of the debtor;
(B) an officer of the debtor;
(C) a person in control of the debtor;
(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(E) a general partner in a partnership described in clause
(D); or
(F) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(iii) if the debtor is a partnership,
(A) a general partner in the debtor;
(B) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of,
or a person in control of the debtor;
(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general
partner;
(D) a general partner in a partnership described in clause
(C); or
(E) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate
were the debtor; and
(v) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a
security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or
equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of
ownership.
(ll) "Relative" means an individual related by consanguinity
within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or
an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the
third degree.
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(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means that a lien is effective against the holder of
a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or
proceedings.
§ 2. Insolvency
(a) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater
than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
(b) A debtor who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent.
(c) A partnership is insolvent under subsection (a) if the sum of the
partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all
of the partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each
general partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership
debts.
(d) Assets under this section do not include property that has been
transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the
transfer voidable under this [Act].
(e) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as
an asset.
§ 3. Value
(a) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for
the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is
secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise
made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to
furnish support to the debtor or another person.
(b) For the purposes of Sections 4(a)(2) and 5, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor
in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure
sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of
the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or
security agreement.
(c) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the
debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and
is in fact substantially contemporaneous.
§ 4. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the
transfer or incurred the obligation:
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(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor
of the debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or
her] ability to pay as they became due.
(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property
transferred after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred,
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the
amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
( 10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business
to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
§ 5. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present Creditors
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or
the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an
insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and
the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
§ 6. When Transfer is Made or Obligation is Incurred
For the purposes of this [Act]:
( 1) a transfer is made:

No.3]

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

569

(i) with respect to an asset that is real property other than
a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser
under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so
far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the
debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be
perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior
to the interest of the transferee; and
(ii) with respect to an asset that is not real property or
that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
otherwise than under this [Act] that is superior to the interest
of the transferee;
(2) if applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the
commencement of an action for relief under this [Act], the transfer
is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the
action;
(3) if applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1), the transfer is made when it
becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee;
(4) a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights
in the asset transferred;
(5) an obligation is incurred:
(i) if oral, when it becomes effective between parties; or
(ii) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed
by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.

§ 7. Remedies of Creditors
(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this
[Act], a creditor; subject to the limitations in Section 8, may obtain:
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;
[(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by [ ];]
(3) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance
with applicable rules of civil procedure,
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor
or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other
property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset
transferred or of other property of the transferee: [sic]or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the
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debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the
asset transferred or its proceeds.

§ 8. Defenses, Liability, and Protection of Transferee
(a) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Section 4(a)(l)
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent
value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a
transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under Section 7(a)(1), the
. creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as
adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose
benefit the transfer was made; or
(2) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee
who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(c) If the judgment under subsection (b) is based upon the value of
the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the
value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the
equities may require.
(d) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under
this [Act], a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of
the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to
(1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset
transferred;
(2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(e) A transfer is not voidable under Section 4(a)(2) or Section 5 if
the transfer results from:
(1) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the
termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(2) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
(t) A transfer is not voidable under Section S(b):
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit
of the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was
secured by a valid lien;
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or
(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose
as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.

§ 9. Extinguishment of [Claim for RelieD [Cause of Action]
A [claim for relief] [cause of action] with respect to a fraudulent
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transfer or obligation under this [Act] is extinguished unless action is
brought:
(a) under Section 4(a)(1), within 4 years after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been
discovered by the claimant;
(b) under Section 4(a)(2) or 5(a), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
(c) under Section 5(b), within one year after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred.
§ 10. Supplementary Provisions
Unless displaced by the provisions of this [Act], the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal
and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its provisions.
§ 11. Uniformity of Application and Construction
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act]
among states enacting it.
§ 12. Short Title
This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
§ 13. Repeal
The following acts and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed[.]

